Systematic comparisons of fertility developments based on education, gender and country context are rare. Using harmonized register data, we compare cohort total fertility and ultimate childlessness by gender and educational attainment for cohorts born beginning in 1940 in four Nordic countries. Cohort fertility (CTF) initially declined in all four countries, although for cohorts born in the 1950s and later, the CTF remained stable or declined only modestly. Childlessness, which had been increasing, has plateaued in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Women’s negative educational gradient in relation to total fertility has vanished, except in Finland, while men’s positive gradient has persisted. The highest level of men’s childlessness appears among the least educated. In the oldest female cohorts, childlessness was highest among the highly educated, but these patterns have changed over the cohorts as childlessness has increased among the low educated and remained relatively stable among higher educated women. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, childlessness is now highest among the least educated women. We witness both a new gender similarity and persistent (among men) and new (among women) educational disparities in childbearing outcomes in the Nordic region. Overall, the number of low educated has decreased remarkably over time. These population segments face increasing social and economic disadvantages that are reflected as well in their patterns of family formation. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1007/s10680-018-9492-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

This article focuses on the time frame of intentions to have a child. For both parents and childless people we compare those who want a child now with those who intend to have a child within the next three years. Based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour and using data from Norway (N=1,307), we investigate the role of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control on these two different time frames in fertility intention. The results show that subjective norms have a significant effect on the timing of intentions to have a child for both childless people and parents: the more both groups feel that their intention to have a child is supported by their families and friends, the more likely they are to want a child now compared to within the next three years. It also show that positive attitudes have a significant effect on intending to have a child now rather than later for parents but not for childless people. Perceived behavioural control is a significant determinant for both groups: people who consider themselves better able to cope with having child are more likely to intend to have a child now rather than within the next three years. But this effect disappears when we control for demographic background variables, suggesting that the effect of perceived control on the timing of having a child varies considerably with personal circumstances.

During the 2010s, fertility rates fell across the Nordic region. The onset of thesedeclines seems linked to the Great Recession of 2008–2009 but their continuation cannot easilybe linked to subsequent economic change. The 1990s, too, brought episodes of economic crisesto the Nordic region that were followed by different degrees of fertility decline. In this study,we provide an empirical overview of parity-, age- and education-specific fertility developmentsin the five Nordic countries in the wake of the economic recessions in 2008 and the early 1990s,respectively. We demonstrate a high degree of heterogeneity in fertility developments acrosscountries after 1990, whereas after 2008, the trends are much more similar across the fivecountries. Likewise, the educational differences in birth hazards that characterized thedevelopments after 1990 were much smaller in the initial years after 2008–2009. This reversalfrom heterogeneity to homogeneity in the fertility response to recessions calls for an expansionof theories on the cyclicality of fertility in relation to uncertainty and economic and socialchange. In our discussion, we consider the role of a set of factors that also incorporates the state,crisis management, and perceptions of economic and welfare uncertainty.

This paper focuses on the realization of positive fertility intentions with different time frames. The analyses are based on a unique combination of survey data and information from Norwegian administrative registers on childbearing in the years following the complete selected sample. Guided by the theoretical and empirical framework of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), the results suggest that a fertility intention's time frame is relevant for childbearing behaviour, but the patterns are somewhat different for respondents who were childless at the time of the interview compared to those who already had children. Overall, childless were less likely to realize their fertility intentions than parents. Following the TPB, childless may underestimate the difficulty of acting on their intentions and therefore have more difficulty realizing their intentions, versus parents who take into account their ability to manage another child. The results also show that childless with an immediate fertility intention are more likely to succeed than those with a longer-term intention. Likewise, parents with an immediate fertility intention are more likely to realize their intention during the two first years after the interview, but after four years the childbearing rate was higher among those with longer-term fertility intentions.

With historically similar patterns of high and stable cohort fertility and high levels of gender equality, the Nordic countries of Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are seen as forerunners in demographic behavior. Furthermore, Nordic fertility trends have strongly influenced fertility theories. However, the period fertility decline that started around 2010 in many countries with relatively high fertility is particularly pronounced in the Nordic countries, raising the question of whether Nordic cohort fertility will also decline and deviate from its historically stable pattern. Using harmonized data across the Nordic countries, we comprehensively describe this period decline and analyze the extent to which it is attributable to tempo or quantum effects. Two key results stand out. First, the decline is mostly attributable to first births but can be observed across all ages from 15 to the mid-30s. This is a reversal from the previous trend in which fertility rates in the early 30s increased relatively steadily in those countries in the period 1980–2010. Second, tempo explains only part of the decline. Forecasts indicate that the average Nordic cohort fertility will decline from 2 children for the 1970 cohort to around 1.8 children for the late 1980s cohorts. Finland diverges from the other countries in terms of its lower expected cohort fertility (below 1.6), and Denmark and Sweden diverge from Finland, Iceland, and Norway in terms of their slower cohort fertility decline. These findings suggest that the conceptualization of the Nordic model of high and stable fertility may need to be revised.

This article examines how the migration behavior of older parents and adult children might be influenced by the geographical configuration of nonresident family networks and the emergence of "linked" life events. Background: Researchers have long pointed to the importance of intrahousehold family events as triggers for migration, yet few have detailed how choices over whether, when, and where to migrate are formed with reference to significant others outside of the household. Method: Utilizing geocoded register data for Norway, we identified intergenerational family networks comprising older parents (aged 55+) and their nonresident adult children living 20 km or more apart. We recorded the presence and location of various family ties, the occurrence of several life events, and analyzed their

Gender equality and equity in the division of household labor may be associated with couples' transitions to first, second, and third births. Our comprehensive analysis includes the division of housework and childcare as well as the perception of whether this division is fair and satisfactory. We use a unique dataset combining the Norwegian Generations and Gender Survey (2007) with information on childbirths within three years after the interview from the population register. We found that an unequal division of housework is associated with a decreased chance of first and subsequent births. Childcare is most relevant when the respondent is satisfied with the division, as one-child couples where the respondent is less satisfied with the division of childcare are less likely to have a second child. Our findings suggest that, even in a high-equity context such as Norway, equality and equity in the household are also important for childbearing.

During the 2010s, fertility rates fell across the Nordic region. The onset of these declines seems linked to the Great Recession of 2008–2009, but their continuation cannot easily be linked to subsequent economic change. The 1990s, too, brought episodes of economic crises to the Nordic region that were followed by different degrees of fertility decline. In this study, we provide an empirical overview of parity-, age- and education-specific fertility developments in the five Nordic countries in the wake of the economic recessions in 2008 and the early 1990s, respectively. We demonstrate a high degree of heterogeneity in fertility developments across countries after 1990, whereas after 2008, the trends are much more similar across the five countries. Likewise, the educational differences in birth hazards that characterized the developments after 1990 were much smaller in the initial years after 2008–2009. This reversal from heterogeneity to homogeneity in the fertility response to recessions calls for an expansion of theories on the cyclicality of fertility in relation to uncertainty and economic and social change. In our discussion, we consider the role of a set of factors that also incorporates the state, crisis management, and perceptions of economic and welfare uncertainty.