Performance audit is widely used in public administration, but, at present, little empirical evidence exists on its usefulness and contribution to accountability. Based on survey data from 353 civil servants in Norway, this article analyzes the auditees' perceptions of the audit. Performance audit was seen as useful by a majority of the auditees. If auditees agreed to audit criteria and assessments, were allowed to influence the process, had favourable opinions of the reports, and believed that the State Audit Institution contributed to accountability and improvement, then they regarded it as useful. Reports used for accountability purposes were not perceived as less useful. The auditees' administrative level, the use of the report to further interests, and attention from politicians, the media, and the Parliament impacted on the accountability dimension. These results indicate that performance audit can influence civil servants, but the influence is contingent on how the audited civil servants perceive the performance audit.

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Performance audit is widespread but contested. The "audit society" proposition holds that audits are rituals producing comfort, whereas the "mandatory audit" proposition in public policy presumes that audits have positive impacts. Common to both propositions is the lack of empirical evidence of audit impact. This article analyzes survey data of the auditees' tendency to make changes as a consequence of Supreme Audit Institutions' performance audits. Civil servants who had experienced performance audits responded that ministries and agencies tend to make changes, but instrumental, institutional, and political factors have an effect on the institution's propensity to make changes.

The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of performance audit on public policy. The article investigates performance audit reports and the debates they initiate in the public realm.The case of Norway is analysed using mixed methods including a questionnaire, mapping and categorizing of reports, document studies and interviews. The results show that the Norwegian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is primarily preoccupied with managerial issues.It is nevertheless open to interpretation whether the preoccupation with managerial issues primarily implies an efficiency and effectiveness focus or an assessment of compliance to managerial standards. Most reports get moderate attention in the media and in the parliamentary control committee. Therefore the direct dialogue with the ministries becomes important for the performance audits' influence. In the public debate the SAI, the ministries and the members of parliament base their argumentation in different institutional logics. These logics can lead to different interpretations of the control system, laws and regulations and hamper the State Audit Institution's influence.

This article analyses survey data regarding the impact of supreme audit institutions’ (SAIs) performance audit on public administration in four Nordic countries. Regression analysis with pooled data from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden indicates that performance audits have positive impacts on usefulness, changes, improvements and, to some extent, accountability, as perceived by auditees who have experienced the audits. The results show that some of the factors that earlier research found important for the impact of performance audits in some countries were insignificant for all the four Nordic countries, but that SAIs’ legitimacy, audit quality and consequences of media attention were important factors.

Based on the theory of professional competition, this paper identifies and investigates four strategic options of supreme audit institutions (SAIs) through a case study of four Nordic national audit offices: a performance auditing strategy; a financial auditing strategy; a portfolio strategy; and a hybrid strategy. The analysis of the Nordic SAIs shows that while one SAI appears to have adopted a hybrid strategy, the portfolio strategy has been chosen by the three other SAIs, although with some variations in the portfolio. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these strategic options for public sector auditing.

This article uses a case study to analyse two main dilemmas that performance auditors face when auditing complex interventions in governance. The first dilemma, concerning the performance auditors' roles as improvement agents and independent controllers, is that the improvement agenda often implies interacting closely with the auditees whereas controlling requires independence. The second dilemma pertains to the auditors' choice of pre-planned audit criteria which limit what evidence the auditors can document. This choice affects the auditors' role of holding a government to account. It also affects the type of information divulged to stakeholders concerning the social intervention that is evaluated.

Ministries are increasingly subject to control, primarily by State Audit Institutions'. This control is assumed to contribute to improvement. Based on survey data from 353 civil servants in Norway this article analyses the ministries' and agencies' responses to the SAIs control. The analysis shows that civil servants in the ministries tend to be less positive to performance audit than civil servants in the agencies. Top executives, irrespective of administrative level, were more negative than middle managers and other public employees.In addition civil servants more exposed to performance audit were, in general, more negative towards it.