Auditors’ understanding of evidence: A performance audit of an urban development programme

Abstract

This article uses a case study to analyse two main dilemmas that performance auditors face when auditing complex interventions in governance. The first dilemma, concerning the performance auditors' roles as improvement agents and independent controllers, is that the improvement agenda often implies interacting closely with the auditees whereas controlling requires independence. The second dilemma pertains to the auditors' choice of pre-planned audit criteria which limit what evidence the auditors can document. This choice affects the auditors' role of holding a government to account. It also affects the type of information divulged to stakeholders concerning the social intervention that is evaluated.

Supreme audit institutions in a high‐impact context: A comparative analysis of performance audit in four Nordic countries

“…Therefore, in the audit process the auditors often use checklists and demand specific information, which may help the auditors in being as objective and systematic as they can, modelled after the accounting profession. Sometimes, however, the auditees see this procedure of being made auditable as formalistic and ‘rigid’ without adding value (Reichborn‐Kjennerud & Johnsen, ). Therefore, we expect that performance audits that are perceived as rigid are less useful than performance audits that are perceived as less rigid (H7).…”

The ‘front stage’ of substance auditing: A study of how substance auditing is presented in performance audit reports

“…In order to present the results of the audit and to fulfil the assignment to establish ‘whether, at what cost, and to what degree the policies, programmes and projects of government are working’ (Pollitt & Summa, , p. 2), SAIs have to establish clear and precise criteria against which judgements about ‘good’ or ‘poor’ performance can be made. Whereas other evaluation practices may be based on a huge element of professional discretion and judgement, the criteria in PAs are expected to be clear, precise and well‐motivated in the PA reports (Reichborn‐Kjennerud & Johnsen, ). However, governments and other formal mandates in central government rarely define and establish a clear set of auditable objectives for the particular policy, programme or activity under scrutiny (English, ; Kastberg & Ek Österberg, ; Pollitt & Mul, ).…”

“…Several members of the research community have called for a shift in focus and for performance auditors to increase the number of audits of substance. As examples, Everett () and Reichborn‐Kjennerud and Johnsen () suggest that SAIs’ focus on systems rather than substance do not generate the information needed to ensure political accountability. In addition to accountability concerns, scholars also suggest that substance audits have a greater potential to improve performance in public sector organizations (Everett, ; Kells, ; Lapsley & Pong, ; Put, ) and some scholars also suggest that an increased focus on substance audits would increase the SAIs’ impact and relevance in society (Pollitt & Summa, ; Reichborn‐Kjennerud, ).…”

Auditee Strategies: An Investigation of Auditees’ Reactions to the Norwegian State Audit Institution’s Performance Audits

“…Lapsley and Pong (2000) based the assessment of impact on the opinion of the auditors themselves. There is also some research on the impact of audit institutions at the local level (Johnsen et al 2001;Reichborn-Kjennerud et al 2011;Tillema et al 2010;Weets 2011). …”