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NAFTA Chapter 19 sets up bilateral review panels to replace the domestic judicial appeals process of resolving disputes among NAFTA members over the enforcement of unfair trade laws. In principle, such panels can change the incentive structure of filing unfair trade law petitions by reducing the likelihood of an affirmative finding of injurious unfair trade. Using data from U.S. and Canadian unfair trade petition filings, empirical tests show support for this hypothesis. However, a more comprehensive settlement of conflicts will require progressive legal integration, including an extension of national treatment measures to alleged "unfair trade" that is not currently envisaged under the NAFTA. Copyright 2000 Western Economic Association International.

While the WTO now represents most of the world's population, GDP, and trade, the accession process since its founding has been lengthy, and it is getting longer. Compared to its predecessor, the GATT, the WTO applies a much more detailed and legalistic approach to accession, due to its broader scope of policy coverage and the enforcement powers of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In WTO accession cases, WTO incumbent members have a superior bargaining position. The present study provides evidence that the elapsed time from WTO application to accession has increased with the number of completed accessions, suggesting a process of learning by WTO members to bargain for more demanding concessions from applicants. Regarding the terms of accession, the number of rules commitments has increased, and the level of bound tariffs has fallen, as the number of completed accessions has increased. In view of the difficult cases remaining in order to complete universal WTO membership, the author proposes more flexibility in accession requirements, along the lines of the GATT tradition. *