Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an increasingly pervasive phenomenon on the European and North American economic and political landscape. In this paper, we extend neo-institutional and stakeholder theory to show how differences in the institutional environments of Europe and the United States affect expectations about corporate responsibilities to society. We focus on how these differences are manifested in government policy, corporate strategy, and non-governmental organization (NGO) activism towards specific issues involving the social responsibilities of corporations. Drawing from recent theoretical and empirical research, and analysis of three case studies (global warming, trade in genetically modified organisms, and pricing of anti-viral pharmaceuticals in developing countries), we find that different institutional structures and political legacies in the US and EU are important factors in explaining how governments, NGOs, and the broader polity determine and implement preferences regarding CSR in these two important world regions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2006.

In this article, we review critiques of international business (IB) research with a focus on whether IB scholarship tackles "big questions." We identify three major areas where IB scholars have addressed important global phenomena, but find that they have had little influence outside of IB, and only limited effects on business or government policy. We propose a redirection of IB research toward "grand challenges" in global business and the use of interdisciplinary research methods, multi-level approaches, and phenomena-driven perspectives to address those questions. We argue that IB can play a more constructive and vital role by tackling expansive topics at the business-societal interface.

The emergence of organized civil society and of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as organizational manifestations of broader social movements has dramatically altered the global political–economic landscape. The increasing global reach of NGOs challenges established international business (IB) research, and highlights opportunities for broadening and adapting extant paradigms in the field. In this article, we introduce the concept of NGOs and contrast them with their private-sector (firm) and public-sector (government) counterparts within the context of IB. We discuss factors giving rise to NGOs as important organizational entities that participate in global value creation and governance, and identify limits to their efficacy and viability. We identify important questions raised by incorporating NGOs into our conceptualization of global context, and we challenge three basic tenets of IB theory: the definition and dynamics of an institutional field, the relevance/centrality of a firm–government (i.e., two-sector) bargaining model, and the pre-eminence of the firm as the global organization of interest within the field. We conclude by offering suggested research directions that should serve as catalysts for this new and potentially rich area of future IB research. Journal of International Business Studies (2004) 35, 463–483. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400112

W ith globalization and the growth in emerging economies, multinational enterprises (MNEs) now frequently confront challenges associated with corrupt governments. Already, a growing body of research has demonstrated that corruption significantly reduces a country's aggregate inflows of foreign direct investment through its effects on firm performance. We move the analysis of corruption from aggregate financial flows toward managerial theory and practice by examining how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt environments and how different types of corruption affect firms' choices. Building on institutional theory, we predict that MNEs will respond to pervasive and arbitrary corruption in a host country by selecting particular types of equity and nonequity modes of entry. Using data on 220 telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies, we find that firms adapt to the pressures of corruption via short-term contracting and entry into joint ventures. We also find that the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions has a significant impact on firms' decisions, in addition to the overall level of corruption. In contrast to extant research, we show that MNEs use nonequity-entry modes or partnering as an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption.

No abstract