In the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy dialogue has shifted from its half century focus dominated by the superpower struggle with the Soviet Union to the challenges presented by so‐called “rogue states.” For many observers, however, the term “rogue state” is viewed as problematic failing to providing either a clear picture of who and what constitutes a rogues state, or, perhaps more importantly, the ramification of this term on U.S. policy action. In examining the public statements of key U.S. foreign policy decision makers over the course of 1993 to 2004, this paper offers insights as to the perceptions which manifest the “rogue” stereotype as exhibited by statements on the policies and behaviors associated with rogue states. What is revealed is a relatively fixed and stable image over time as held by key decisions‐makers with similar unity expressed as to policy prescriptions. Combining perceptions of power capabilities and cultural judgments unique to this rogue stereotype, the rogue image presents a challenge to U.S. strategy demanding attention to the future threat posed by these states while also constraining policy options.

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O’Reilly, K. P. (2012) A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign Policy Behavior. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743‐8594.2011.00171.x To further explore the impact of strategic culture on foreign policy, this article examines the development of the “Rogue Doctrine” within US strategic culture following the Cold War. Critics allege that this doctrine constrains strategic choice resulting in aggressive policies toward alleged rogue states. To assess the impact of this security narrative, the operational codes of two US presidents, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, are examined. Analysis reveals distinct differences between their perceived interactions with rogue and nonrogue states. The resulting interactions manifest the unique nature of US‐rogue state interactions as these US leaders possess starkly different images of both rogue others as well as self. In the context of dealing with rogue states, these leaders’ perceptions of self undergo major transformations indicating tendencies toward more aggressive tactics and the use of force.

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