Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the "Rogue State" Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy Elites

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy dialogue has shifted from its half century focus dominated by the superpower struggle with the Soviet Union to the challenges presented by so‐called “rogue states.” For many observers, however, the term “rogue state” is viewed as problematic failing to providing either a clear picture of who and what constitutes a rogues state, or, perhaps more importantly, the ramification of this term on U.S. policy action. In examining the public statements of key U.S. foreign policy decision makers over the course of 1993 to 2004, this paper offers insights as to the perceptions which manifest the “rogue” stereotype as exhibited by statements on the policies and behaviors associated with rogue states. What is revealed is a relatively fixed and stable image over time as held by key decisions‐makers with similar unity expressed as to policy prescriptions. Combining perceptions of power capabilities and cultural judgments unique to this rogue stereotype, the rogue image presents a challenge to U.S. strategy demanding attention to the future threat posed by these states while also constraining policy options.

A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign Policy Behavior

“…Instead of viewing Other as prone to cooperation, compromise and the avoidance of force, Clinton sees rogues as predisposed to conflict and the use of force. The operational code expressed by these presidents’ is hardly surprising given the nature of the behaviors and policies which are so frequently attributed to rogue states (O’Reilly 2007). Rather, the surprise is that their perceptions of rogues were not more negative, perhaps casting these actors as more aggressive Type B leaders, given the various depictions of rogue states by US leaders (Tanter 1998; Hoyt 2000a; O’Reilly 2007).…”

“…The development of the Rogue Doctrine was an important occurrence in US strategic culture replacing the long‐standing Cold War rivalry following the demise of the Soviet Union. The resulting shift in US security thinking imposed structure to a new, but uncertain, security environment, creating a narrative depicting US global interests as being threatened by a new type of enemy, the so‐called “rogue state.” These states are characterized by their aggressive tendencies, threatening posture toward regional neighbors, as well as the international community in general, sponsorship of international terrorism, and most notably, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Klare 1995a; Hoyt 2000a,b; Litwak 2000; O’Reilly 2007).…”

“Bringing FPA Back Home:” Cognition, Constructivism, and Conceptual Metaphor

“…13 13 Without discussing NMD specifically, Hoyt (2000) and O’Reilly (2007) show how rogue state formed a cognitive “image” that shaped US leaders’ policies towards states identified as rogues. …”

Rogues, Pariahs, Outlaws

“…Although the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), aggression and support for terrorism are frequently suggested as defining elements of rogueness (Homolar 2011, O'Reilly 2007, a closer look reveals that double standards are used when states are singled out for their alleged rogueness (pleasurably pointed out by Chomsky 2000). Although the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), aggression and support for terrorism are frequently suggested as defining elements of rogueness (Homolar 2011, O'Reilly 2007, a closer look reveals that double standards are used when states are singled out for their alleged rogueness (pleasurably pointed out by Chomsky 2000).…”