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Previous analysis of marketing organization has focused on the coordination of marketing activities and on organizational forms used to accomplish this, while ignoring the organization of marketing tasks at the work unit level. This article develops a contingency approach to the structure and performance of marketing activities at the work unit level, as well as higher levels within organizations, by blending the theoretical implications of traditional organization theory and transaction cost economics. Four propositions are developed to explain the effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptiveness of various marketing organizational structures. In addition, four basic structures of marketing organization are also explored.

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Effects of commitment to future bargaining were studied in 40 male dyads. Undergraduate students were randomly assigned to a 2 (bargaining or nonbargaining) X 2 (same person or different person) X 2 (seller or buyer) factorial design. Subjects participated in a simulated automobile-trading task, knowing only their own profits on which experimental compensation was based. Results indicated that commitment to future bargaining was associated with more extreme initial bids (p < .05) and, for dyads, less equitable bargaining outcomes (p < .05). Expectation of future interaction with the same person was associated with lower minimum acceptable profits (p < .05) for subjects, while dyads expecting future interaction together reached more equitable bargaining outcomes (p < .05). The extent and nature of anticipated future interactions influenced marketing transactions.