Commitment to future interaction in marketing transactions.

Roering, Kenneth J.; Slusher, E. Allen; Schooler, Robert D.

doi:10.1037/h0076628

Cited by 24 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…In both bargaining (e.g., Roering et al, 1975) and non-bargaining (e.g., Shapiro, 1975) contexts, there is support for an equality-oriented distribution of rewards in studies of anticipated future interaction in dyads. As noted above, the knowledge that they will be bargaining again is likely to motivate bargainers to undertake actions that project an aura of fairness.…”

Section: Negotiation Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Extending the arguments of the Roering et al (1975) study, bargainers expecting no future interaction should not be inhibited by fairness norms and should demonstrate even higher aspirations than bargainers with EFNI. Consequently, under Non-EFI situations, negotiators should have higher aspirations than negotiators with EFNI.…”

Section: Pre-negotiation Behavioral Influencesmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…In turn, this situation provides the opportunity for greater friendliness, which Newcomb and Bagwell (1995) showed increased the desire for fairness in relationships. Examining research on negotiations, Roering et al (1975) found more extreme initial bids under Non-EFI compared to the EFI scenarios. Consequently, parties in an EFNI situation are more likely than Non-EFI bargainers to attain agreements that are relatively equal in terms of profits.…”

Section: Negotiation Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…When a commitment to future bargaining is present, Roering et al (1975) describe EFNI as involving two competing pressures that foster a quite different psychological orientation than is present in once-only transactions. First, is the desire to establish a strong bargaining image in order to inhibit future exploitation by the opposing party.…”

Section: Pre-negotiation Behavioral Influencesmentioning

confidence: 98%

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The impact of expectation of future negotiation interaction on bargaining processes and outcomes

Patton

Balakrishnan

2010

Journal of Business Research

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Section: Negotiation Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Pre-negotiation Behavioral Influencesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Negotiation Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Pre-negotiation Behavioral Influencesmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The impact of expectation of future negotiation interaction on bargaining processes and outcomes

Patton

Balakrishnan

2010

Journal of Business Research

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“…If managers believe that their relationship with the opponent firm will be short-term-that this is the last time they will be setting competing budgets-they have nothing to lose by choosing the singleplay dominant solution which is the competitive strategy. By contrast, in a long-term relationship, awareness of mutual dependence and the advantages of bilateral cooperation may encourage managers to choose the cooperative strategy (Corfman and Lehmann 1993;Murnighan and Roth 1983;Roering, Slusher and Schooler 1975). Although managers may prefer to cooperate in long-term relationships, they may also choose to modify their behavior in reaction to a competing firm's behavior.…”

Section: The Situationmentioning

confidence: 91%

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Role of Information in Setting Advertising Budgets

Corfman

Lehmann

1994

Journal of Advertising

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This study examines OOw advertising budget setting, framed as a prisoner's dilemma, is affected by information on the competitive situation and characteristics of the decision maker. Hypotheses are tested using experiments in which subjects set advertising budgets. Results indicate that subjects were generally competitive, but also based their strategy selections on what they expected their opponents to do, what their opponents did last time, whether the competitive relationship was expected to continue, market shares, and whether the subject's profit objectives were short-or long-term. Individual differences also played a part in determining strategy selection. IntroductionAdvertising budgeting continues to be a controversial topic. The recent switch in emphasis from advertising to promotion spending has had a major impact on the advertising industry and touched off a spirited debate on the long-run effects of advertising and promotion. Part of this debate suggests that, by using promotion in place of advertising, managers are making less than optimal decisions. Yet, surprisingly little is known about how managers actually set advertising budgets and little attention is paid to this issue. For example, Muncy (1991) found that only nine of 603 articles published in the Journal of Advertising over the preceding 20 years focused on budgets.The payoffs from advertising budgeting decisions (and most other management decisions) depend not only on the decision-maker's own actions, but on the actions of other parties as well. This is particularly true in competitive environments. Advertising, promotion, pricing, and product quality decisions, for example, are all decisions where payoffs are determined, in part, by competitive reaction. This study is designed to contribute to our understanding of some of the important information and decisionmaker characteristics that affect the advertising budget decision. Many studies have addressed what information managers should. use, but little research confronts what they actually use in forming their strategies and how their personalities and experience affect their choices.To explore these questions we begin with a prisoner's dilemma, presented as the management decision task of setting advertising budgets for four regional brands of a mature product in a duopoly, and examine when decision-makers make choices due to information or individual tendencies not incorporated in the standard prisoner's dilemma. Information available for their use includes the profits possible for both firms, the history and duration of the competitive relationship, relative market share, and profit objectives.Findings indicate that when the classic prisoner's dilemma is enriched to represent more closely the complex strategic task of setting advertising budgets, subjects often do not adhere to the normative recommendations of the basic game. Specifically, we found that subjects generally set high advertising budgets and predicted that their opponents would set low advertising budgets more often than th...

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Counterpart strategy, prior relations, and constituent pressure in a bargaining simulation

Slusher

1978

Syst. Res.

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This article concerns decision making by bargaining in systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, and supranational systems.A 2 x 2 x 2 (conflictual or peaceful X strong or weak x cooperative-competitive or competitive-cooperative) factorial design was used to examine the effects of the prior relationship between the bargaining parties, constituent pressure on the bargaining representative, and the counterpart's strategy. The dependent variables were subject decisions in the bargaining simulation, attitudinal factors, and future intentions. Data were collected from 160 male subjects in a laboratory simulation of group interactions. The task consisted of assuming the role of a management bargaining representative and making ten bargaining decisions on various issues. Results indicated that a cooperative-competitive counterpart strategy gave a higher level of overall subject cooperation, but a more competitive final decision, a less favorable attitude toward the counterpart, and less willingness to retain the counterpart in future bargaining. Strong constituent pressure produced greater subject competitiveness, but a more negative attitude toward the constituent. Peaceful prior relations resulted in a more cooperative initial decision, but did not affect the overall level of cooperation. Interactive effects showed that subjects encountering a cooperative-competitive strategy and contlictual prior relations were more willing to participate in future bargaining when they received strong constituent pressure. Conversely, if a competitive-cooperative strategy and peaceful relations occurred, there was more willingness to participate in the future when weak constituent pressure existed.

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Commitment to future interaction in marketing transactions.

Cited by 24 publications

References 6 publications

The impact of expectation of future negotiation interaction on bargaining processes and outcomes

The impact of expectation of future negotiation interaction on bargaining processes and outcomes

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Role of Information in Setting Advertising Budgets

Counterpart strategy, prior relations, and constituent pressure in a bargaining simulation

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