Some observers, including many "doomsday" futurists, have contended that a pre dominant characteristic of future society will be extreme scarcity. Viewing this as sumption of extreme scarcity as plausible (though not necessarily most probable), this conjectural essay considers some of the possible effects of sustained scarcity, particu larly sharp declines in public spending and public employment, on public organization behavior. The focus is on the effects of scarcity on four types of strategic choices in public organizations: domain selection, development and deployment of technology, organization structure, and organization process. Arguments are developed that public organizations facing sustained scarcity could be expected to: constram their domain definition, allow domarn selection to dictate technology, seek clientele suited to existing technologies, and, m general, take actions that will ensure that existing technologies are employed at capacity. Further, we argue that narrow efficiency criteria will become paramount and will give rise to more formal, centralized, and rigid organization structures and a habituation of organizational responses to environ mental change.

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Effects of commitment to future bargaining were studied in 40 male dyads. Undergraduate students were randomly assigned to a 2 (bargaining or nonbargaining) X 2 (same person or different person) X 2 (seller or buyer) factorial design. Subjects participated in a simulated automobile-trading task, knowing only their own profits on which experimental compensation was based. Results indicated that commitment to future bargaining was associated with more extreme initial bids (p < .05) and, for dyads, less equitable bargaining outcomes (p < .05). Expectation of future interaction with the same person was associated with lower minimum acceptable profits (p < .05) for subjects, while dyads expecting future interaction together reached more equitable bargaining outcomes (p < .05). The extent and nature of anticipated future interactions influenced marketing transactions.

Three studies of labor-management negotiations were conducted within the context of a business simulation game. Face-to-face bargaining lasted approximately two hours and resulted in settlements that were incorporated into the simulation game parameters. A total of 56 simulated companies, each comprised of five MBA students, were studied. Results from the first study showed that extending low initial offers, extracting large first concessions, and making a high number of concessions were management bargaining tactics associated with obtaining a low wage rate. These findings were supported by study two. The third study found that an intrateam power mode of orientation was positively correlated with bargaining success and was negatively correlated with overall game success. The results support the use of a simulation game for teaching and research in bargaining.

The propensity to cooperate in single plays of three game structures (chicken, no conflict, and prisoner's dilemma) under two conditions of commitment to future interaction, using two experimental environments, was investigated. In addition, the effects of negative payoffs and the opportunity to maximize relative rather than absolute gain were examined. The results showed that committed subjects were more cooperative in all three structures than were uncommitted subjects. The propensity to cooperate was greatest for the no conflict structure, weakest for the prisoner's dilemma structure, and intermediate for the chicken structure. The largest difference between committed and uncommitted subjects in the propensity to cooperate was observed for the prisoner's dilemma structure. A comparison of these results with repeated play studies supports the use of single play studies of social interaction for analyzing the effects of social structure on behavior.