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Taxation 3 Abstract 4 This study reveals that the environmental tax gets less stringent when the manufacturer's 5 distribution channel becomes more decentralized. Contrary to the classic double marginalization 6 problem, the first implication is that a monopolistic manufacturer benefits from decentralization 7 when its technology is sufficiently polluting. Secondly, with two competing manufacturers, both 8 are more likely to decentralize in equilibrium when their technologies are more polluting. Under 9 certain conditions, decentralized manufacturers may enjoy higher profits thanks to tax cuts without 10 affecting social welfare or consumer surplus. Various extensions of the base models confirm the 11 robustness of the analytical results. 12

A strategic analysis is conducted to incorporate corporate social responsibility (CSR) considerations into managerial incentive design in a duopoly where each firm comprises an owner and a manager. Consumer surplus is adopted to represent the firms' CSR concerns and a CSR-related incentive is introduced to accommodate both profit and consumer surplus. Bertrand and Cournot competition modes are discussed with the firms' products being complementary, independent, or substitutable. We first examine the equilibrium of CSR-related incentive design and, then, analyze how CSR-related incentives affect the firms' profitability and CSR performance, measured by consumer surplus and social welfare.

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