Single vs. cross distribution channels with manufacturers’ dynamic tacit collusion

Bian, Junsong; Zhao, Xuan; Liu, Yunchuan

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.07.029

Cited by 18 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…However, the authors explored the effect of only a limited number of game scenarios. Taking another perspective, some researchers [10] compare the performance of supply chain members under competition by allowing cross-selling activities, i.e., instead of selling their products through an exclusive retailer, they sell products with both retailers. However, they ignore the effect of non-pricing factors influencing market demand.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We investigate the optimal decisions under five-game structures. Under game structure DD, each member in competing GSCs implement a decentralized decision, which is similar to [10,13]. Under game structure MC, two upstream manufacturers are integrated by centralized management and set wholesale prices and green quality levels that maximize the sum of profits for two manufacturers [9].…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a strategic measure, integration with a horizontal competitor [9] or 'collusion formation' [10] is not unusual in the business environment. For example, stable collaborative relationships between Apple and Samsung [11] support this possibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Next, we explore optimal decisions in two game structures to explore the effect of horizontal integration. In the first game structure, two upstream manufacturers jointly decide wholesale prices and green quality levels of product that maximize total upstream profits [10], and, in the second game structures, two retailers jointly decide retail prices by maximizing the sum of downstream profits [9]. Finally, we consider two game structures to explore the effect of vertical integration.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

et al. 2020

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This study explores the optimal pricing and investment decision for two competing green supply chains, both consisting of a manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. Our focus is to explore, does the strategic integration decision with rivals at the horizontal level or with partners at the vertical level have any effect on green product types? The results reveal the following insights: retailer-retailer strategic integration at downstream level leads to a sub-optimal total supply chain profit and green quality level for a development-intensive green product. Two competing manufacturers can produce products at a higher level if they are vertically integrated with respective retailers. Manufacturer-manufacturer integration at upstream level sometimes leads to higher profits and product quality level if cross price-elasticity of consumers is high. However, an opposite phenomenon is observed while they are selling for a marginal-intensive green product, horizontal integration can improve green quality levels, but supply chain members will receive a lower profit. Therefore, selection of green product types and strategic integration decision are interrelated to achieve the profit maximization goal along with the aim to offer products at a higher green quality level. Vertical integration strategy can outperform horizontal integration strategy, especially if cross-price elastic for green products remain high.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

et al. 2020

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“…Nie et al [28] investigated the effects of a cross online-and-offline channel (OOC) on two competing retailers' distribution channel strategies and showed that such retailers may abandon the OOC strategy when the cross-channel effect is significantly negative. Bian et al [29] analyzed the dynamic interactions between manufacturers' distribution channel strategies and incentives for collusion. ey suggested that a single distribution channel does not always facilitate collusion between manufacturers and held that the selection of the distribution channel mainly depends on the discount factor and on the degree of product differentiation.…”

Section: Distribution Channel Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Lee

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Environmental sustainability has become a critical indicator in evaluations of the success and efficiency of supply chain management. In this study, we consider a two-echelon supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers, two retailers, and one third-party logistics firm. The first manufacturer produces a green product, while the second manufacturer produces a nongreen product. Each of the two retailers can sell only a green product, only a nongreen product, or both green and nongreen products. All products are initially stored by the third-party logistics firm and delivered to the retailers. This study investigates product pricing, the degree of greenness of the first manufacturer’s product, and carbon emission reduction as carried out by the third-party logistics firm. Using a three-stage Stackelberg game framework, we present the equilibrium strategy on pricing, the degree of greenness, and carbon emission reduction for five different distribution channel structures. One of our major findings is that competition between the two manufacturers has a positive influence on the profitability of the supply chain. We also find that it is desirable for each manufacturer to choose a cross-distribution channel for its products considering the sustainability and profitability of the supply chain.

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Profitable pathways: unraveling sales strategies and collusion impact in e-tailer-manufacturer supply chains

Sarabi,

Taleizadeh,

Jolai

2024

Ann Oper Res

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Single vs. cross distribution channels with manufacturers’ dynamic tacit collusion

Cited by 18 publications

References 34 publications

Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

Strategies on Pricing, Greenness Degree, and Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chains under Single and Cross Distributions of Green and Nongreen Products

Profitable pathways: unraveling sales strategies and collusion impact in e-tailer-manufacturer supply chains

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