No abstract

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

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contextual levels (regional and national) of right-wing climate, and three types of outgroup attitudes (i.e., age-, ethnicity-, and gender-based), the analyses consistently revealed crosslevel interactions, showing a strong association between right-wing attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes at the individual level in contexts with a low right-wing climate, whereas this relationship is weaker and often even absent in contexts with a high right-wing climate.These cross-level interactions remained significant after controlling for statistical artefacts (i.e., restriction of range and outliers). The authors propose norm setting as the mobilizing mechanism through which a right-wing climate develops and curbs the influence of individual right-wing social-ideological attitudes on outgroup attitudes. 3The mobilizing effect of right-wing ideological climates: Cross-level interaction effects on different types of outgroup attitudes Research on negative outgroup attitudes and its determinants has been on the forefront of scientific research in social psychology since the 1950s (e.g., Allport, 1954). Several personality traits and social-ideological attitudes have been proposed as important bases of how people think and feel about outgroups, such as authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-

No abstract

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Study 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

Freedom of speech for all citizens is often considered as a cornerstone of democratic societies. In three studies, we examined the relationship between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech for a variety of social groups across the ideological spectrum ( N 1 varies between 1,373 and 18,719, N 2 = 298, N 3 = 395). Corroborating our theoretical expectations, although cognitive ability was related to more affective prejudice toward relatively conservative groups and less affective prejudice toward relatively liberal groups (Study 2), people with higher levels of cognitive ability were more in favor of freedom of speech for all target groups (Studies 1–3). The relationship between cognitive ability and freedom of speech support was mediated by intellectual humility (preregistered Study 3). These results indicate that cognitive ability contributes to support for the democratic right of freedom of speech for all social–ideological groups.

This research examined how affective and cognitive responses to culture fusion, a specific type of culture mixing that features the blending of different cultures or parts thereof into a new entity, are influenced by individual differences in Need for Closure (NFC). Two studies showed that individuals high (vs. low) in NFC felt less favorable toward culture fusion (i.e., the affective response), both at an abstract level (i.e., society structure models; Study 1, N = 191) and at a more concrete level (i.e., food stimuli; Study 2, N = 257). In addition, high NFC individuals tended to assign culturally fused stimuli to one discrete culture, rather than acknowledging them as culturally hybrid (i.e., the cognitive response). Furthermore, mediation analyses showed that the relationships between NFC and responses toward culture fusion were mediated by Right-Wing Authoritarianism. These findings are interpreted in terms of the threat to epistemic security needs posed by culture fusion.