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This study empirically investigates the antecedent, mediating, and outcome variables of budgetary participation in Turkey. Turkey is an interesting setting to investigate the impact of budgetary participation on job satisfaction and performance because of its unique cultural and institutional factors. We propose that the information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates creates the need for budgetary participation, and the outcomes of budgetary participation (i.e., job satisfaction and performance) will be mediated by goal commitment and role ambiguity. Based on a questionnaire survey of 194 mid-level managers in Turkey, we find that role ambiguity mediates the budgetary participation–job satisfaction and budgetary participation-performance relationships. The results are consistent with the view that the primary benefit of budgetary participation is to decrease role ambiguity, leading to more job satisfaction and better performance. Furthermore, we find that goal commitment mediates the budgetary participation-performance relationship. This result suggests that participation in the budgeting process increases goal commitment, which in turn leads to better performance. This study will be beneficial for companies in general and for organizations in developing countries in particular to realize that budgetary participation alone does not improve job satisfaction and performance. Rather, it is the increased commitment and decreased role ambiguity that results from managers' participation in the budgetary process that improves job satisfaction and performance. JEL Classifications: D21, G32, L1, M41.

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The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of misfits between business strategy and management control systems on performance. We address the following research question: Do firms that align their management control systems with the specific requirements of their business strategy perform significantly better than those that do not achieve the required match? We define a misfit as the degree to which management control systems deviate from empirically derived optimal configurations for a given type of business strategy. We use the two-stage approach proposed by Ittner and Larcker (2001) to measure misfit and to investigate the impacts of misfit on performance. Based on a questionnaire survey of executives from 109 banks, we hypothesize and find that the strategy-control systems misfit has a significantly negative correlation with both self-rated and publicly available performance measures. RÉSUMÉLes auteurs ont pour but d'analyser les re´percussions qu'ont sur la performance les inade´quations entre les strate´gies d'entreprise et les syste`mes de controˆle de gestion. Ils se penchent sur la question suivante : « Les entreprises qui coordonnent leur syste`me de controˆle de gestion avec les exigences particulie`res de leur strate´gie d'entreprise affichent-elles une performance sensiblement meilleure que celles qui n'y parviennent pas ? » Selon les auteurs, l'inade´quation s'entend de la mesure dans laquelle les syste`mes de controˆle de gestion de´vient des configurations « optimales » de´rive´es de l'expe´rience, pour un type donne´de strate´gie d'entreprise. Ils utilisent l'approche en deux temps propose´e par Ittner et Larcker (2001) pour mesurer l'inade´quation et pour e´tudier les re´percussions de l'inade´quation sur la performance. À la lumie`re d'un sondage par questionnaire mene´aupre`s de cadres supe´rieurs de 109 banques, ils confirment l'hypothe`se formule´e selon laquelle l'inade´quation entre strate´gie et syste`me de controˆle pre´sente une corre´lation ne´gative significative avec les mesures de la performance, tant lorsque cette dernie`re est auto-e´value´e que lorsqu'il s'agit d'une donne´e accessible au public.

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