The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm performance

Jermias, Johnny; Gani, Lindawati

doi:10.1016/j.bar.2013.12.001

Cited by 119 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…Chen, Elder, and Hsieh (2007) conclude that only if the outside directors have accounting/financial expertise, will the probability of earnings management be decreased. Prior studies indicate that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and the educational background represents the individual human capital and competence of the directors (Anderson et al, 2011;Hillman & Dalziel, 2003;Jermias & Gani, 2014;Reeb & Zhao, 2013;Sitthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2013). Thus, based on these prior studies, this study incorporates the two factors of director professionalism and education into the board member characteristics.…”

Section: Board Member Characteristics and Real Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board Member Characteristics and Ownership Structure Impacts on Real Earnings Management

Liu

Tsai

2015

AFR

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This study tests the impacts of board member characteristics and ownership structure on real earnings management for firms listed in Taiwan. Rather than examining board member characteristics individually, a "board member quality index" is established based on seven different factors of the board member characteristics (independence, ownership, professionalism, education, busyness, meeting attendance and pledges). This index is used as a proxy measure of the characteristics of the board members. The results reveal that better board member quality results in greater suppression of real earnings management and indicate that our index is successful in evaluating the effectiveness of the board member characteristics of firms in Taiwan. In addition, this study finds that institutional investor ownership of Taiwanese firms plays an important role in curbing real earnings management. However, managerial ownership does not influence the ownership-real earnings management relationship.

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Section: Board Member Characteristics and Real Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board Member Characteristics and Ownership Structure Impacts on Real Earnings Management

Liu

Tsai

2015

AFR

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“…The larger boards are more likely to have more and diverse reputational capital, and experience effective monitoring and control, which may result in higher quality of financial reporting process. On the other hand, Jermias and Gani (2014) and Guest (2009) find that it is relatively easier for the CEOs of firms having larger boards to influence outside directors and win their loyalty. Therefore, it can be assumed that firms with larger boards have lower quality of financial reporting.…”

Section: Corporate Governance Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Busyness of audit committee directors and quality of financial information in India

Hundal

2016

IJBGE

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Abstract:The audit committees, as a part of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, play an important role to enhance the financial reporting quality. The busyness of audit committee members of a firm in boards and committees of other firms can affect its independent functioning, ceteris paribus. The current study examines, first, the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and quality of financial reporting in India, second, whether endogenously determined busyness limits of busyness of the audit committee members provide better insights than those exogenously mandated by regulators. The study finds that endogenously determined busyness limits of sub-samples and the full sample explain the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and financial reporting quality in a better way than those stipulated by regulators. Further, a lower (higher) level of busyness of audit committee members enhances (deteriorates) financial reporting quality of firms.

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“…Desde la teoría de la agencia se plantea que la asimetría de información puede permitir a los administradores prácticas oportunistas para maximizar sus propios intereses a expensas de los accionistas (Jermias & Gani, 2014). En este sentido, el monitoreo de la gestión que realiza la junta directiva es un elemento clave para limitar comportamientos oportunistas (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).…”

Section: Gestión Y Organizaciónunclassified

“…En este sentido, el monitoreo de la gestión que realiza la junta directiva es un elemento clave para limitar comportamientos oportunistas (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Algunas prácticas de la junta directiva son consideradas más eficientes en el monitoreo de la gestión (Jermias & Gani, 2014); de esta forma, la inclusión de miembros externos, la dualidad del Chief Executive Officer (ceo), cuando este es la misma persona que preside la junta directiva, y el tamaño de la junta se han destacado en el estudio de la relación gobierno corporativo-desempeño.…”

Section: Gestión Y Organizaciónunclassified

Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas

Cortés¹,

Ramírez²,

Gómez-Betancourt³

2018

Innovar

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El gobierno corporativo como herramienta para minimizar los problemas de agencia parece tener un efecto positivo en el desempeño. Este trabajo analiza la relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño financiero en empresas colombianas. A través del método generalizado de momentos (GMM), se estimó dicha relación en un panel de datos balanceado para 104 empresas inscritas en el Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores (RNVE) durante el periodo 2008-2014. Las empresas fueron clasificadas como empresa familiar (EF), cuando se identificó una familia como accionista controlante mayoritario. El desempeño fue aproximado a partir de la rentabilidad del activo (ROA) y la rentabilidad del patrimonio (ROE). Para medir el nivel de gobierno corporativo se usaron las 41 prácticas recomendadas en el Código País. Se encontró que solo las prácticas alusivas a la junta directiva se relacionan con el roa, mientras que en el caso del roe no se encontró evidencia de relación con alguna de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo. Respecto al carácter familiar, se encontró que, cuando una familia es el primer accionista controlante, las empresas presentan mayor desempeño. No obstante, cuando los dos primeros accionistas controlantes son familias, se observó que no existe relación con el desempeño

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The impact of board capital and board characteristics on firm performance

Cited by 119 publications

References 69 publications

Board Member Characteristics and Ownership Structure Impacts on Real Earnings Management

Board Member Characteristics and Ownership Structure Impacts on Real Earnings Management

Busyness of audit committee directors and quality of financial information in India

Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas

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