The enactment of the counter-terrorism 'Prevent duty' in British schools and colleges: Beyond reluctant accommodation or straightforward policy acceptance When Britain imposed the 'Prevent duty', a legal duty on education, health and social welfare organisations to report concerns about individuals identified as atrisk of radicalisation, critics argued it would accentuate the stigmatisation of Muslim communities, 'chill' free speech, and exacerbate societal securitisation. Based on 70 interviews with educational professionals and a national online survey (n=225), this article examines their perceptions of how the duty has played out in practice. It then provides an explanation for why, contrary to expectations, not only has overt professional opposition been limited, but there has been some evidence of positive acceptance. It is argued that these findings neither simply reflect reluctant policy accommodation nor do they simply reflect straightforward policy acceptance, but rather they comprise the outcome of multilevel processes of policy narration, enactment and adaptation. Three processes are identified as being of particular importance in shaping education professionals' engagement with the duty: the construction of radicalisation as a significant societal, institutional and personal risk; the construction of continuity between the Prevent duty and existing professional practices; and the responsibilisation of first-line professionals. The conclusion reflects on the wider public and policy implications of these findings.

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Drawing on mixed methods research carried out with school and college staff during 2015 and 2016, this chapter provides insight into how the Prevent Duty 'landed' in schools and colleges during the first 18 months after its introduction in July 2015. The discussion centres on

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Most groups do less violence than they are capable of. Yet while there is now an extensive literature on the escalation of or radicalisation towards violence, particularly by 'extremist' groups or actors, and while processes of de-escalation or de-radicalisation have also received significant attention, processes of non-or limited escalation have largely gone below the analytical radar. This article contributes to current efforts to address this limitation in our understanding of the dynamics of political aggression by developing a descriptive typology of the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the mechanisms through which members of the groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain limits upon their own violence. We identify five underlying logics on which the internal brakes operate: strategic, moral, ego maintenance, outgroup definition, and organisational. The typology is developed and tested using three very different case studies: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s.

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Since the Second World War, Great Britain has witnessed a recurring escalation and de-escalation of confrontations between extreme right-wing or anti-minority protest groups on the one hand and, on the other, militant anti-fascist or antiracist groups, and latterly also a number of extreme Islamist groups. In this article, we trace the outline of four waves of these movement -countermovement contests in order to engage critically with ideas of what some academics have called "cumulative extremism (CE)". Contrary to the tenor of much of the public, policy and academic debate around such contests, we draw attention to what we describe as the missing spirals of violence. In order to better explain and accommodate these empirical findings, we argue that it is important to resist the temptation to reduce "CE" to a process of "tit-for-tat" violence. We outline four factors that have been particularly important in shaping patterns of interactive escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation in the case studies described: the broader strategic aims of activist groups; dynamics of intramovement control and leadership; the actions of and activist's interactions with state actors; and emergent movement cultures and identities.