The internal brakes on violent escalation: a typology

Abstract

Most groups do less violence than they are capable of. Yet while there is now an extensive literature on the escalation of or radicalisation towards violence, particularly by 'extremist' groups or actors, and while processes of de-escalation or de-radicalisation have also received significant attention, processes of non-or limited escalation have largely gone below the analytical radar. This article contributes to current efforts to address this limitation in our understanding of the dynamics of political aggression by developing a descriptive typology of the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the mechanisms through which members of the groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain limits upon their own violence. We identify five underlying logics on which the internal brakes operate: strategic, moral, ego maintenance, outgroup definition, and organisational. The typology is developed and tested using three very different case studies: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s.

How the “Internal Brakes” on Violent Escalation Work and Fail: Toward a Conceptual Framework for Understanding Intra-Group Processes of Restraint in Militant Groups

“…Much of the discussion among British jihadi sympathizers on Telegram, for instance, revolved around the notion of legitimate targeting and, in particular, excommunication: when it applied, to whom and the broader implications of declaring other believers, including close family, nonbelievers, with members variously inspired by pro-IS or Al-Qaeda sources, or torn by which position to adopt. 52 The second type of contexts we refer to as action planning contexts. These are the settings in which group members attend to the specifics of developing and undertaking a particular action or campaign: identifying targets, considering logistical arrangements in progressively greater detail, allocating roles to different group members, seeking permissions or the blessings of relevant movement authorities, deciding whether or not to inform or engage with public authorities about their plans, discussing thresholds for the abandonment of the action, ruling out certain courses of action, and so forth.…”

“…The case study examined how actors within the U.K. responded to efforts, spearheaded by the so-called Islamic State (IS), to expand and escalate jihadi violence. Here we focused on the evolution of the Al-Muhajiroun movement, which had always avoided direct association with terrorism but ended up embracing IS after its declaration of a "caliphate," 13 and an autonomous cell of individuals operating primarily on the social networking site Telegram, who pledged allegiance to IS and sought to carry out attacks in the U.K. 14 While Al-Muhajiroun publicly embraced IS, within the Telegram network some members began to question the validity and efficacy of IS tactics. These dynamics were studied in the wider context of debates concerning the limits of Islamist-inspired violence and responses to its escalation, particularly as articulated by leaders of Al-Qaeda.…”

“…In the project report and the first article, 20 we argued that it was indeed possible to develop a typology of the "internal brakes" on violent escalation, and that the typology that we developed enabled us to describe the braking practices observed across the three main case studies and across other cases described in the academic literature.…”

Why Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation Happened between Islamists and Anti-Islamists in Britain but Not in Norway

“…Busher et al identify both tactical and moral constraints as internal brakes on violence. 36 Tactical constraints may be considerations of whether violence can be used effectively or if it will only lead to a loss of popular support. 37 Moral constraints are rooted in the group's ideological foundation and can include principles against using violence.…”

The Double-Edged Sword of Banning Extremists from Social Media

“…In addition, it could happen through a variety of different pathways: convincing those who are part of extremist groups or who hold extremist ideologies that violence is not a legitimate way to pursue their political goals; making it more difficult for extremists who are in favor of violence to carry out attacks; or convincing those who are part of extremist groups or hold extremist ideologies that they are not so threatened that violence is warranted at this point. As Busher, Holbrook, and Macklin observe, extremist groups might even decide themselves to avoid violence (Busher et al, 2019).…”