The paper begins by arguing that there are striking similarities between Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's views on the issue of consciousness, and that Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche regarding this issue has been unjustly neglected so far. On the other hand, the paper also argues that each of those similarities hides an important nuance of difference: in fact, (a) where Schopenhauer sees substantial unity, Nietzsche finds relations and unsubstantial multiplicity; (b) where Schopenhauer sees causality, Nietzsche finds "power", (c) where Schopenhauer still thinks in dualistic terms, Nietzsche experiments with conceiving of the phenomena in terms of an adualistic continuum of dynamic power relations, sign relations and perceptual relations, so that (d) where Schopenhauer sees essential oppositions, Nietzsche finds development along a continuum. Thus, Nietzsche uses Schopenhauer's views as a point of departure -but his departure from Schopenhauer is, in the end, quite radical. The interpretation of this radical departure is shown to be essential for clarifying Nietzsche's position regarding the crucial issues raised by the most recent literature on his critique of consciousness (e.g. epiphenomenalism and the question of the "free will"). Zusammenfassung: Im Beitrag wird zunächst gezeigt, dass es frappierende Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Schopenhauers und Nietzsches Ansichten über das Phänomen des Bewusstseins gibt und dass Schopenhauers Einfluss auf Nietzsche hier viel größer ist als bisher erforscht. Andererseits wird dargelegt, dass hinter den Ähnlichkeiten bedeutsame Unterschiede stecken: (a) wo Schopenhauer Einheit und Substanz sieht, findet Nietzsche Verhältnisse und unsubstanzielle Vielheit; (b) wo Schopenhauer Ursache und Wirkung sieht, findet Nietzsche "Macht"; (c) wo Schopenhauer noch in dualistischen Gegensätzen denkt, experimentiert Nietzsche damit, die Phänomene in einem adualistischen Kontinuum dynamischer Macht-, Zeichen-und Wahrnehmungs-Verhältnisse zu verstehen, so dass (d), wo Schopenhauer Wesensgegensätze sieht, Nietzsche kontinuierliche Entwicklungen findet. So sind Schopenhauers Ansichten für Nietzsche ein Ausgangspunkt -aber am Ende geht er ziemlich radikal über sie hinaus. Die Interpretation dieser radikalen Überwindung Schopenhauers erweist sich als besonders erhellend für Nietzsches Position in den Hauptpunkten der jüngsten Debatte über seine Kritik des Bewusstseins (z. B. Epiphänomenalismus und "Freiheit des Willens"). Schlagwörter: Bewusstsein, Trieb, Affekt, Instinkt, Zeichen, Macht, Kontinuum. Brought to you by | University of Victoria McPherson Library Serials Authenticated Download Date | 6/5/15 12:01 AM 1 For the metaphorical image of consciousness as a mirror in Nietzsche's published work, cf. GS 354, KSA 3.590 -593; HH I 132, KSA 2.125 f.; for consciousness as a surface, cf. D 125, KSA 3.116 f.; GS 354; EH, Why I Am So Clever 9
* Agradeço a Robert Pippin, Christoph Schuringa e Simon May os seus encorajadores e estimulantes comentários a uma anterior versão deste artigo. Agradeço também a Rogério Lopes, Oswaldo Giacóia, John Richardson, Paul van Tongeren e Marco Brusotti os seus comentários a uma outra versão (bastante simplificada) deste artigo, que apresentei em Belo Horizonte no 2º congresso internacional Nietzsche e a tradição filosófica. Um particular obrigado a Katia Hay e Herman Siemens pelos seus comentários a outras versões deste artigo. Agradeço também, como de costume, a inestimável colaboração da Maria João Mayer Branco. Resumo: O artigo é uma tentativa de explorar a hipótese controversa de que possa haver uma profunda afinidade -até agora não identificada -entre a concepção de "luta por reconhecimento" [Kampf um Anerkennung] em Hegel e a concepção da dinâmica da "vontade de poder" [Wille zur Macht] em Nietzsche. Esta hipótese diz respeito ao modo como a luta e a dominação estão implícitas na noção hegeliana de reconhecimento, isto é: diz respeito à dinâmica intersubjetiva das formas falhadas de reconhecimento. A luta e a dominação (bem como a violência) são conceitos fundamentais na concepção do reconhecimento em Hegel -mas, ainda assim, conceitos meramente operacionais na obra de Hegel, enquanto em
El objetivo de este artículo es indicar muy sucintamente que mediante la comprensión de las semejanzas y diferencias de Nietzsche respecto a los puntos de vista de Schopenhauer sobre los conceptos y los signos, se puede ver claramente la forma en que trata de superar algunos de los enigmas epistemológicos y ontológicos más importantes de la modernidad; es decir, por qué su filosofía, en muchos aspectos, puede ser vista ya como «contemporánea» o «actual». El artículo presenta primero seis tesis de Schopenhauer sobre los conceptos y los signos, después seis tesis de Nietzsche que pueden parecer idénticas a las de Schopenhauer, pero que acaban siendo radicalmente diferentes. Mi tesis principal es que la concepción nietzscheana de las palabras y de los conceptos en términos de «signos» le debe mucho a Schopenhauer, y sin embargo, representa, en definitiva, un cambio radical del punto de vista de Schopenhauer y de toda la filosofía moderna.
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