Abstract-With the exponential growth of cyber-physical systems (CPS), new security challenges have emerged. Various vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and controls have been introduced for the new generation of CPS. However, there lack a systematic study of CPS security issues. In particular, the heterogeneity of CPS components and the diversity of CPS systems have made it very difficult to study the problem with one generalized model.In this paper, we capture and systematize existing research on CPS security under a unified framework. The framework consists of three orthogonal coordinates: (1) from the security perspective, we follow the well-known taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls; (2)from the CPS components perspective, we focus on cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components; and (3) from the CPS systems perspective, we explore general CPS features as well as representative systems (e.g., smart grids, medical CPS and smart cars). The model can be both abstract to show general interactions of a CPS application and specific to capture any details when needed. By doing so, we aim to build a model that is abstract enough to be applicable to various heterogeneous CPS applications; and to gain a modular view of the tightly coupled CPS components. Such abstract decoupling makes it possible to gain a systematic understanding of CPS security, and to highlight the potential sources of attacks and ways of protection.
Cryptography plays an important role in computer and communication security. In practical implementations of cryptosystems, the cryptographic keys are usually loaded into the memory as plaintext, and then used in the cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, the private keys are subject to memory disclosure attacks that read unauthorized data from RAM. Such attacks could be performed through software methods (e.g., OpenSSL Heartbleed) even when the integrity of the victim system's executable binaries is maintained. They could also be performed through physical methods (e.g., cold-boot attacks on RAM chips) even when the system is free of software vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose Mimosa that protects RSA private keys against the above software-based and physical memory attacks. When the Mimosa service is in idle, private keys are encrypted and reside in memory as ciphertext. During the cryptographic computing, Mimosa uses hardware transactional memory (HTM) to ensure that (a) whenever a malicious process other than Mimosa attempts to read the plaintext private key, the transaction aborts and all sensitive data are automatically cleared with hardware mechanisms, due to the strong atomicity guarantee of HTM; and (b) all sensitive data, including private keys and intermediate states, appear as plaintext only within CPU-bound caches, and are never loaded to RAM chips.To the best of our knowledge, Mimosa is the first solution to use transactional memory to protect sensitive data against memory disclosure attacks. We have implemented Mimosa on a commodity machine with Intel Core i7 Haswell CPUs. Through extensive experiments, we show that Mimosa effectively protects cryptographic keys against various attacks that attempt to read sensitive data from memory, and it only introduces a small performance overhead.
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