Advertising and service investment can enhance brand goodwill to increase the sales of branded goods. However, the impact of advertising and services on brand goodwill is not immediate but delayed. At the same time, due to the different service characteristics provided by various channels, the phenomenon of bidirectional free-riding occurs. Therefore, this paper studies the dynamic cooperation between service and advertising in the O2O (online to offline) supply chain dominated by brand owners and explores the impacts of advertising, service delay and service free-riding among channels on the dynamic cooperation decisions of the O2O supply chain. A differential game model between brands and retailers is constructed by incorporating the delay effect and the bidirectional free-riding phenomenon. The optimal advertising and service strategies and performance problems of O2O supply chain enterprises under a centralized decision, brand cost-sharing decision and bilateral cost-sharing decision are compared and analyzed. The influence of delay time, showrooming and webrooming effects on the profit of each firm is investigated by example. The results show that the service strategy, advertising strategy and brand goodwill of the O2O supply chain members are optimal under a centralized decision. Still, the supply chain profit is not necessarily optimal under the delay time, showrooming and webrooming effect coefficients. Bilateral cost-sharing contracts can achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain performance. Appropriate setting of a bilateral cost-sharing ratio can adjust the adverse effects of delay and bidirectional free-riding. The long-term strategies to deal with the delay and bidirectional free-riding phenomena are as follows: the bilateral cost-sharing contract can improve corporate profits. Setting the wholesale price, online direct-selling price and service-sharing ratio by brand owners can effectively promote retailers’ investment in service, achieving a win-win situation. Retailers maintain high pricing and service levels to enhance the brand premium ability of physical stores and achieve long-term development.
In this article, we construct a three-stage supply chain model using a system of differential equations to reveal the interplay among producers, distributors, and end customers. On the one hand, information about the products and production is exchanged between each stage in the supply chain system. Such information affects the behaviors of each stage. On the other hand, the transport of products between the stages of the supply chain affects the behavior of the system. Our findings are summarized as follows: First, we find that the supply chain model is a system with four chaotic attractors. Second, we explore the synchronization of such a chaotic system. Third, according to the characteristics of the chaotic system, we design a variety of simple control laws to realize the synchronization of two chaotic systems with the same structure. These control laws for the chaotic system are proved to realize local asymptotic synchronization or global exponential synchronization. Numerical simulations are conducted to confirm that the designed controls work well.
To solve the interchannel service-sharing decision problem, this paper constructs a dual-equilibrium linkage model between the static Stackelberg game and dynamic evolutionary game, considers the influence of bidirectional free riding and the proportion of service sharing the cost, and also studies the short-term equilibrium strategy and long-term stability strategy of the band owners and franchisees. The study indicates that, under the static Stackelberg model, as the cost of service sharing gradually decreases, the equilibrium strategy changes from the lose-lose situation of prisoner’s dilemma to the Pareto Optimum of service sharing cooperation between the two parties. Under the dynamic evolutionary game, the offline free riding coefficient decreases, the cost-sharing ratio of the service sharing band increases, and the online free riding coefficient is still within the interval, and the stability result will change from the complete service competition to service sharing cooperation between channels.
As the important logistics nodes, the level of the logistics service is port's core competitiveness, and it is also the important external manifestations. It is to improve the competitiveness of logistics, which is an important means to enhance the competitiveness of Ningbo -Zhoushan port. This paper constructs evaluation index system about the port logistics competitiveness and employs the compositive method of factor analysis and cluster analysis to evaluate the logistics competitiveness. With SPSS, in order to further analyze Ningbo -Zhoushan Port Logistics competitiveness, this paper is firstly based on factor analysis to make logistics competitiveness ordering of evaluating objects and point out the major factors, and secondly based on cluster analysis to cluster the evaluating objects.
Logistics node is one of the key points in the logistics network and logistics resources integration.As a result, the selection and scheduling of the impact factors of the nodes are important to the design of logistics network. In Ningbo, the logistics network is based on ports and stations. We can evaluate and analyze of the selection and scheduling of the impact factors of the nodes by the method of AHP, establishment of Evaluation System of Index System of ports and stations.Keyword-the analysis of hierarchy;logistics network;influencing factors
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.