Service Sharing Decisions between Channels considering Bidirectional Free Riding Based on a Dual-Equilibrium Linkage Algorithm

Abstract

To solve the interchannel service-sharing decision problem, this paper constructs a dual-equilibrium linkage model between the static Stackelberg game and dynamic evolutionary game, considers the influence of bidirectional free riding and the proportion of service sharing the cost, and also studies the short-term equilibrium strategy and long-term stability strategy of the band owners and franchisees. The study indicates that, under the static Stackelberg model, as the cost of service sharing gradually decreases, the equilibrium strategy changes from the lose-lose situation of prisoner’s dilemma to the Pareto Optimum of service sharing cooperation between the two parties. Under the dynamic evolutionary game, the offline free riding coefficient decreases, the cost-sharing ratio of the service sharing band increases, and the online free riding coefficient is still within the interval, and the stability result will change from the complete service competition to service sharing cooperation between channels.