This article questions prevailing interpretations of New Labour's political economy and challenges the assumption within the comparative and international political economy literatures of the exhaustion of the Keynesian political economic paradigm. New Labour's doctrinal statements are analysed to establish to what extent these doctrinal positions involve a repudiation of Keynesianism. Although New Labour has explicitly renounced the ‘fine tuning’ often (somewhat problematically) associated with post-war Keynesian political economy, we argue that they have carved out policy space in which to engage in macroeconomic ‘coarse tuning’ inspired by Keynesian thinking. This capacity to ‘coarse tune’ is precisely what is being sought in New Labour's quest for credibility through the redesign of British macroeconomic policy framework and institutions. Our empirical focus on New Labour in government since 1997 offers considerable evidence that this search for the capacity to ‘coarse tune’ has been successful.

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Proteinase-activated receptor-2 (PAR-2) is a member of a family of G-protein-coupled, seven-transmembrane domain receptors that are activated by proteolytic cleavage. The receptor is expressed in a number of different tissues and potential physiological activators identified thus far include trypsin and mast cell tryptase. Acrosin, a trypsin-like serine proteinase found in spermatozoa of all mammals, was found to cleave a model peptide fluorescent quenched substrate representing the cleavage site of PAR-2. This substrate was cleaved with kinetics similar to those of the known PAR-2 activators, trypsin and mast cell tryptase. Acrosin was also shown to induce significant intracellular calcium responses in Chinese hamster ovary cells stably expressing intact human PAR-2, most probably due to activation of the receptor. Immunohistochemical studies using PAR-2 specific antibodies indicated that the receptor is expressed by mouse oocytes, which suggests that acrosin may play additional role(s) in the fertilization process via the activation of PAR-2 on oocytes. ß

he idea that the British economy has in some sense declined in the past T century informs most recent historical writing, especially economic, but also social and political. 'Declinism' can aptly be described as an ideology, a set of ideas and assumptions which are popular and largely unquestioned, articulated in both elaborate and more cursory treatments.2 The central assumption of declinism is that, measured by one or more aggregate economic indices, economic performance has been deficient and that, in principle, this deficiency is, or was, avoidable or remediable. Declinism therefore embraces the belief that something could and should be done to improve economic performance. Few have disputed this approach to modern British economic h i~t o r y .~The objective of this article is not to debate whether the British economy has declined or not. Rather, the aim is to treat the notion of decline itself as an historical product and explore its origins. The questions addressed are how and why such a pervasive approach to recent British economic history came into being. To do this it is necessary first to differentiate between notions of decline.

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IntroductionIt is a commonplace of both political and academic argument that the last quarter of twentieth century saw major diminution of national economic policy autonomy, with increased capital mobility identified as the key explanatory variable. Despite such qualification regarding capital mobility impact, the idea of 1970s as a watershed for national policy autonomy is still pervasive. 9 This article looks at how that credibility is constructed in the contemporary period (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003), and goes on to analyse the degree of enduring fiscal policy autonomy in two cases -Britain and

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