Inventing 'Decline': The Falling behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years

Abstract

he idea that the British economy has in some sense declined in the past T century informs most recent historical writing, especially economic, but also social and political. 'Declinism' can aptly be described as an ideology, a set of ideas and assumptions which are popular and largely unquestioned, articulated in both elaborate and more cursory treatments.2 The central assumption of declinism is that, measured by one or more aggregate economic indices, economic performance has been deficient and that, in principle, this deficiency is, or was, avoidable or remediable. Declinism therefore embraces the belief that something could and should be done to improve economic performance. Few have disputed this approach to modern British economic h i~t o r y .~The objective of this article is not to debate whether the British economy has declined or not. Rather, the aim is to treat the notion of decline itself as an historical product and explore its origins. The questions addressed are how and why such a pervasive approach to recent British economic history came into being. To do this it is necessary first to differentiate between notions of decline.

History as Political Rhetoric

“…One attack has come from a questioning of the meaning of the pathologising term decline, however 'relative' it is asserted to be, when applied to an almost continuously expanding economy (Clarke and Trebilcock, 1997). A second has been to historicise the term as a product of a very particular context (Tomlinson, 1996). A third is work which questions the thesis of failure (particularly in the manufacturing industry) which usually accompanies the discussion of 'decline' (Booth, 2003).…”

The Everyday Social Sources of Economic Crises: From "Great Frustrations" to "Great Revelations" in Interwar Britain

“…The 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, for example, was predicated on the notion that “governments [would have not only] the techniques to secure full employment, but that they would be punished politically if they did not deploy those techniques effectively. In this way, governments assumed a new responsibility for the economic welfare of the mass of the population” (Tomlinson 1996:733).…”

“…Rather, Keynesian policies were viewed within Britain as serving a social purpose related to living standards first and an economic growth objective second. It required the construction of other crises between elites, through the discourse of British ''decline'' that began in the late 1950s (Tomlinson 1996), and from elites to the mass public, such as the dramatic 1979 ''Winter of Discontent'' (Hay 1996; see also Widmaier in this symposium), for British governments to make legitimacy claims that could chip away at a mass public consensus around policies we now associate with the Keynesian revolution.…”

The national economic development council 1962–67

“…1 A sense of failure had permeated government and industry since studies undertaken by the OEEC had revealed Britain's comparative industrial decline, and the repeated pattern of economic crises and emergency cuts in government spending had not led to an improvement in the balance of payments situation. 2 The Treasury's management of the economy by manipulating demand had fallen out of favour with industry and there was pressure from a renewed crisis in 1961.…”