People prefer a sure gain to a probable larger gain when the two choices are presented from a gain perspective, but a probable larger loss to a sure loss when the objectively identical choices are presented from a loss perspective. Such reversals of preference due to the context of the problem are known asframing effects. In the present study, schema activation and subjects' interpretations of the problems were examined as sources of the framing effects. Results showed that such effects could be eliminated by introducing into a problem a causal schema that provided a rationale for the reciprocal relationship between the gains and the losses. Moreover, when subjects were freed from framing they were consistently risk seeking in decisions about human life, but risk averse in decisions about property. Irrationality in choice behaviors and the ecological implication of framing effects are discussed.The same information presented in different forms can lead to different decisions. Changes in decision associated with different presentation forms are known asframing effects. For example, people's preference of choices can reverse as a function of the form in which logically identical questions are represented (Bradburn,

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Event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded to explore the electrophysiological correlates of reward processing in the social comparison context when subjects performed a simple number estimation task that entailed monetary rewards for correct answers. Three social comparison stimulus categories (three relative reward levels/self reward related to the other subject's) were mainly prepared: Self:Other=1:2 (Disadvantageous inequity condition); Self:Other=1:1 (Equity condition); and Self:Other=2:1 (Advantageous inequity condition). Results showed that: both Disadvantageous and Advantageous inequity elicited a more negative ERP deflection (N350-550) than did Equity between 350 and 550 ms, and the generators of N350-550 were localized near the parahippocampal gyrus and the medial frontal/anterior cingulate cortex, which might be related to monitor and control reward prediction error during reward processing. Then, Disadvantageous and Advantageous inequity both elicited a more late negative complex (LNC1 and LNC2) than did Equity between 550 and 750 ms. The generators of LNC1 and LNC2 were both localized near the caudate nucleus, which might be related to reward processing under social comparison.

The authors conducted 3 sets of experiments. In the 1st set of experiments, participants made alphabetic position estimations. In the 2nd set, participants made interletter distance estimations. In the 3rd set, they made comparative judgments of the alphabetic order of a pair of letters. The results showed that participants had highly accurate ordinal level information about the alphabet in memory but that interval level information was systematically distorted. In addition, alphabetic serial information was found to be used in 2 distinct modes in memory, depending on whether the representation could be contained within the span of immediate memory.

Three recognition memory experiments were conducted using modified Deese-RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) and DRM paradigms. In Experiment 1, the reaction time (RT) of the false alarms to critical nonpresented words 1 (false memory) was compared with the RT of hits to the critical presented words and with the RT of hits to the studied list words (true memory). The RT of the false alarms to the critical nonpresented words was significantly longer than that of the hits to the critical words and than that of the studied list words. In Experiment 2, in addition to RT, participants' confidence level was measured on a 4-point scale for a yes or no response. Confidence rating was significantly higher for the hits to the critical presented words and to the list words than for the false alarms to the critical nonpresented words. Experiment 3 further showed that how similar false memory experience was to that of true memory was a function of retention size (number of lists of words retained in memory). In all three experiments, the participants' recognition RTs distinguished false memory from veridical memory, and in Experiments 2 and 3, so did their confidence ratings. Therefore, false memory and veridical memory differ at both the objective and the subjective levels. The results are consistent with a single familiarity dimension model of recognition memory.

Participants learned semantic associates and were tested in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. A multiple-trial learning procedure with warning, feedback, and monetary incentive was employed to reduce false memory. Results showed that there was a progressive reduction of false memory over the trials as well as a generalization of learning to new lists of words in avoiding the critical nonpresented words attributable to explicit warning, feedback, and incentive, respectively. Both the feedback and the monetary incentive had an effect beyond what an explicit warning could obtain. In addition, participants were found to achieve false-memory reduction by enhancing the activation of the critical words and the monitoring process, rather than by strengthening the verbatim processing of the list words. It was concluded that false memory may not be as impervious to correction as was believed insofar as an effective training method is applied.

Although a few studies have investigated the integration between some types of unconscious stimuli, no research has yet explored the integration between unconscious emotional stimuli. This study was designed to provide behavioral evidence for the integration between unconsciously perceived emotional faces (same or different valence relation) using a modified priming paradigm. In two experiments, participants were asked to decide whether two faces in the target, which followed two subliminally presented faces of same or different emotional expressions, were of the same or different emotional valence. The interstimulus interval (ISI) between the prime and the target was manipulated (0, 53, 163 ms). In Experiment 1, prime visibility was assessed post-experiment. In Experiment 2, it was assessed on each trial. Interestingly, in both experiments, unconsciously processed valence relation of the two faces in the prime generated a negative priming effect in the response to the supraliminally presented target, independent of the length of ISI. Further analyses suggested that the negative priming was probably caused by a motor response incongruent relation between the subliminally perceived prime and the supraliminally perceived target. The visual feature incongruent relation across the prime and target was not found to play a role in the negative priming. Because the negative priming was found at short ISI, an attention mechanism as well as a motor inhibition mechanism were proposed in the generation of the negative priming effect. Overall, this study indicated that the subliminal valence relation was processed, and that integration between different unconsciously perceived stimuli could occur.

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