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The assessment of expertise is vital both in practical situations that call for expert judgment and in theoretical research on the psychology of experts. It can be difficult, however, to determine whether a judge is in fact performing expertly. Our goal was to develop an empirical measure of expert judgment. We argue that two necessary characteristics of expertise are discrimination of the various stimuli in the domain and consistent treatment of similar stimuli. We combine measures of these characteristics to form a ratio we call the Cochran-Weiss-Shanteau (CWS) index of expertise. The proposed index was demonstrated using two studies that distinguished experts from nonexperts based on their judgmental performance. The index provides new insights into expertise and offers a partial definition of expertise that may be useful in a variety of theoretical and applied settings. Potential applications of this research include selection, training, and evaluation of experts and of expert-machine systems.

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People prefer a sure gain to a probable larger gain when the two choices are presented from a gain perspective, but a probable larger loss to a sure loss when the objectively identical choices are presented from a loss perspective. Such reversals of preference due to the context of the problem are known asframing effects. In the present study, schema activation and subjects' interpretations of the problems were examined as sources of the framing effects. Results showed that such effects could be eliminated by introducing into a problem a causal schema that provided a rationale for the reciprocal relationship between the gains and the losses. Moreover, when subjects were freed from framing they were consistently risk seeking in decisions about human life, but risk averse in decisions about property. Irrationality in choice behaviors and the ecological implication of framing effects are discussed.The same information presented in different forms can lead to different decisions. Changes in decision associated with different presentation forms are known asframing effects. For example, people's preference of choices can reverse as a function of the form in which logically identical questions are represented (Bradburn,