The corporate form and its capacity for agency is recognized in political theory, but not adequately understood. As a result, important shifts in the relative position of the state and the corporate form are not addressed. Starting with a historical exploration of the theory of the corporation, I show that the corporate form relies on multiple theoretical backgrounds, which makes it inconsistent. An important part of this inconsistency is the dominance of a post-1970s theory of the corporate form, which formed the background for New Public Management. This theory supported a reduced status of the state and its regulatory powers and an increase of the relative power of the corporate form. I evaluate some consequences of this inconsistent theory for the contemporary debate with regard to the 'demise of the state'.

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: What is the corpora-on and why does it ma3er?Abstract 'Management' is widely and deeply embedded in 'corporations'. Yet in many studies of management and organization the corporation is an in

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Governance that is celebrated for its 'reflexivity'. By placing the historical genesis of the Code within its politico-economic context, it is shown how its scope and penetration is impeded by a shallow, 'single loop' of reflexivity. Legitimized by agency theory, the Code is infused by a 'cultural grammar' that perpetuates relations of shareholder primacy as it restricts accountability to narrow forms of information disclosure directed exclusively at shareholders. Engagement of a deeper, 'double loop' reflexivity allows account to be taken of the historical conditions and theoretical conceptions that shape practices and outcomes of corporate governance. Only then is it possible to disclose, challenge and reform narrow conceptions, boundaries and workings of 'reflexive governance'. Permanent repository link

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link AbstractIn this paper we explore the financialisation of the university, and how it is possible that universities behave as if they were private corporations despite legally being corporations with a charitable status. We argue that this is largely attributable to financialisation, which creates tension with the university's charitable status. The paper commences with a brief history of incorporation, and examines developments in corporate governance. With the dominance of finance, and the treatment of institutions as mere nexus of contracts, distinctions between public and private become redundant. The paper continues with an account of the effects of financialisation on university governance, under which the university acts increasingly like a for-profit corporation, with its financial governance in direct contradiction to its charitable status. Here, the university emerges as a key site of neoliberalism, where financialised subjects are shaped. Finally, we examine to what extent the financialisation of the university may be halted through a reflection on its status as a charitable corporation.

In this article we discuss the political and economic consequences of the contemporary legal theory of incorporation. We argue that incorporation has developed historically in a way that makes it internally inconsistent, but that this inconsistency is useful for the powerful because of its legal and economic effects. The corporation can “shape shift,” which is very helpful for claiming some rights and disavowing certain responsibilities. Of course this flexibility comes at the expense of consistent concepts and this leads to the creation of what we term an “ideal‐type reified singular representation.” We go on to show the far‐reaching effects of this representation for legal studies, economics, and political theory, and show it worked in the pro‐corporate decision in the recent Citizens United case. We conclude by providing several alternative ways to think about the nature of corporate organization.