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2015
DOI: 10.1177/0018726715593160
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The cultural grammar of governance: The UK Code of Corporate Governance, reflexivity, and the limits of ‘soft’ regulation

Abstract: This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Governance that is celebrated for its 'reflexivity'. By placing the historical genesis of the Code within its politico-economic context, it is shown how its scope and penetration is impeded by a shallow, 'single loop' of reflexivity. Legitimized by agency theory, the Code is infused by a 'cultural grammar' that perpetuates relations of shareholder primacy as it restricts accountability to narr… Show more

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Cited by 35 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…A policy change to oblige all directors to stand down at nine years would result in a greater turnover of positions and hence increased opportunity to appoint a more diverse board. However, not only would this represent a marked break with the UK traditional ‘comply‐or‐explain’ approach to corporate governance (Veldman and Willmott, ), but it would not necessarily get to the heart of the problem. Our previous work on board appointments in the UK (Gregory‐Smith, Main and O'Reilly, ) confirmed the findings for the USA (Farrell and Hersch, ) that boards display a tendency to replace men with men and women with women.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A policy change to oblige all directors to stand down at nine years would result in a greater turnover of positions and hence increased opportunity to appoint a more diverse board. However, not only would this represent a marked break with the UK traditional ‘comply‐or‐explain’ approach to corporate governance (Veldman and Willmott, ), but it would not necessarily get to the heart of the problem. Our previous work on board appointments in the UK (Gregory‐Smith, Main and O'Reilly, ) confirmed the findings for the USA (Farrell and Hersch, ) that boards display a tendency to replace men with men and women with women.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…business as usual-including prioritizing maximization of shareholder value-while claiming to be caring and socially responsible". 56 54 Davis (2009), Horn (2012, Khurana (2007), Johnson (2012Johnson ( , p. 1163Pye (2001Pye ( , 2002, Veldman and Willmott (2016). 55 Banerjee (2008), Jones and Haigh (2007, p. 52);Murphy (2011), Rajak (2011.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…45 Lan and Heracleous (2010). 46 Khurana (2007), Lan and Heracleous (2010), , Veldman and Willmott (2016). 47 Blair andStout (2011), Millon (2014).…”
Section: Corporate Responsibilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The governance structure of a company consists of all of the formal procedures and processes by which decisions are made (Nooteboom, ; Williamson, ). The literature on corporate governance emphasizes the role played by shareholders (Bezemer, Zajac, Naumovska, Bosch, & Volberda, ; Veldman & Willmott, ). This literature is consistent with and influenced by agency theory, which focuses on the power disparities between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers).…”
Section: Corporate Governance Csr and Mental Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%