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This paper presents a model where foreign aid bolsters a developing country's proactive counterterrorism efforts against a resident transnational terrorist group. In stage 1 of the game, the donor country allocates resources to terrorism-fighting tied aid, general assistance, and defensive actions at home. The recipient country then decides its proactive campaign against the common terrorist threat in stage 2, while the terrorists direct their attacks against the donor and recipient countries in stage 3. Terrorists' choices in the final stage provide a solid microfoundation for the terrorists' likelihood of success function. In stage 2, greater tied aid raises the recipient country's proactive measures and regime instability, while increased general aid reduces these proactive efforts and regime instability. In stage 1, a donor's homeland security decisions are interdependent with its aid package to a recipient country, hosting resident transnational terrorists. This interdependency has gone unrecognized to date. JEL classification: H40, O10, D74

This paper constructs a model of trade consequences of terrorism, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism's effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufacturing goods. While terrorism has little or no influence on trade of primary products, terrorism reduces trade of manufactured goods. This novel finding pinpoints the avenue by which terrorism harms trade and suggests why previous studies that looked at all trade found modest impacts. Moreover, the detrimental effect of transnational terrorism on total manufactured trade, exports, and imports as well as on various classes of manufactured trade is substantially larger than that of domestic terrorism. Generally, this adverse impact is more pronounced for imports than for exports.

This paper presents a model where foreign aid bolsters a developing country's proactive counterterrorism efforts against a resident transnational terrorist group. In stage 1 of the game, the donor country allocates resources to terrorism-fighting tied aid, general assistance, and defensive actions at home. The recipient country then decides its proactive campaign against the common terrorist threat in stage 2, while the terrorists direct their attacks against the donor and recipient countries in stage 3. Terrorists' choices in the final stage provide a solid microfoundation for the terrorists' likelihood of success function. In stage 2, greater tied aid raises the recipient country's proactive measures and regime instability, while increased general aid reduces these proactive efforts and regime instability. In stage 1, a donor's homeland security decisions are interdependent with its aid package to a recipient country, hosting resident transnational terrorists. This interdependency has gone unrecognized to date.