2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.003
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Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits

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Cited by 230 publications
(153 citation statements)
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“…Externamente, Estados ganham com a assistência bilateral ao desenvolvimento externo, já que ele pode influenciar as escolhas de políticas do país recebedor em favor do país doador (BALDWIN, 1985;BUENO DE MESQUITA;SMITH, 2007;KUZIEMKO;WERKER, 2006;YOUNAS, 2008). A assistência bilateral ao desenvolvimento também ajuda a angariar o apoio dos legisladores domésticos, já que eles mantêm um controle mais forte.…”
Section: Multilateralismo E Constrangimentos Institucionais Para Os Bunclassified
“…Externamente, Estados ganham com a assistência bilateral ao desenvolvimento externo, já que ele pode influenciar as escolhas de políticas do país recebedor em favor do país doador (BALDWIN, 1985;BUENO DE MESQUITA;SMITH, 2007;KUZIEMKO;WERKER, 2006;YOUNAS, 2008). A assistência bilateral ao desenvolvimento também ajuda a angariar o apoio dos legisladores domésticos, já que eles mantêm um controle mais forte.…”
Section: Multilateralismo E Constrangimentos Institucionais Para Os Bunclassified
“…The potential benefits for the donor include terms-oftrade benefits and larger real incomes for factors used intensively in the export good. Follow ing this line of reasoning, Younas (2008) finds that "a substantially larger amount of aid is provided to recipients who import capital goods, while imports by other category groups have no significant effects. Given that developed donor nations are major producers and exporters of capital goods, this result at least partially supports their trade benefits motive" (p. 661).…”
Section: Donor Motives: the Empirical Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that donors allocate more aid to reward developing countries for the good quality of their economic policies, in particular their trade liberalization policies; -the second examined whether aid allocation hinges on the imports of recipient-countries from donor-countries. Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), Neumayer (2003a), and Younas (2008) have demonstrated that higher total exports from donor countries to the recipient countries results in greater aid allocation. Lundsgaarde et al (2007) provided empirical evidence that donors' imports from developing countries as a share of donors' GDP is significantly and negatively associated with the generosity of these donors, measured by the ratio of ODA provided by a donor to its gross national product (GNP).…”
Section: Trade Openness and Official Development Aidmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The arguments put forth are summarized by Younas (2008) as follows: (i) the marginal impact of aid decreases as the population increases; (ii) high population countries lack the administrative expertise to absorb large amounts of aid; (iii) it is relatively easier for donors to wield political influence over a smaller country than a large country.…”
Section: Equation Specification For Development Aid Flowsmentioning
confidence: 99%