US policy toward the Antarctic between 1939 and 1949 reflected the inability of the Department of State and other government personnel to agree on the region's relevance to national security. Washington's intent to gain worldwide prestige by promoting a harmonious settlement of the dispute over sovereignty claims complicated the international situation to an extent that necessitated a shift to the status quo moratorium proposed by Chile. The United States finally attempted to rally support for this alternative that, in turn, complicated how to exclude the USSR. Although the risk of Soviet encroachment seriously concerned US officials, it posed less immediate dangers than letting conflict escalate between Britain, Chile, and Argentina.
United States policy toward the Antarctic in the 1950s culminated in the treaty that bears the continent's name — the same treaty that continues to govern relations in the far south. Washington succeeded in promoting the admirable objectives of scientific advancement and international cooperation. In doing so, it also forfeited what many officials believed to be the more important objective of formalizing a national sovereignty claim to halt further erosion of the rights associated with its mammoth expeditions. Trapped by having repeated their non-claimancy, nonrecognition policy, which Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes had announced in 1924, US officials scrambled for alternatives. They finally chose to formalize their policy-making paralysis, rather than a claim, by proposing a treaty that called for a political status quo moratorium, in accord with the Chilean Escudero Plan. That decision impressed some experts as unwise, but it was sufficiently expedient to win the signatures needed for ratification.
Although indispensable for hastening the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, United States policy entailed contradictions that jeopardised its domestic ratification. Many senators opposed their government's adherence to the Hughes Doctrine of 1924, requiring sovereignty claims to be based on occupation rather than exploration. US exploration, they knew, had covered more territory than the combined total of the seven nation-states that already had declared their rights based on criteria other than occupation. The Department of State appreciated that public opinion, whether related to Antarctica, the Cold War, or both, might generate congressional pressure to reverse the non-claimant stance and thereby derail the 12-power negotiations even before they reached the conference stage. This article presents evident and hypothetical consequences of policymakers' refusal to address this dilemma, the likelihood of which accompanied an increasingly pro-claimant stance among journalists, as well as the personal exasperation of Admiral Richard E. Byrd.
This one-act play was recently presented at an Antarctic workshop held at Universidad Marítima de Chile, Viña del Mar, Chile. Apart from being entertaining, it provided an example of how theatre can be used to generate or reinforce interest in polar studies. The script has been translated from Spanish by the playwright.
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