Thirty-seven degrees frigid: US-chilean relations and the spectre of polar arrivistes, 1950–59

Particular generalisation: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 in relation to the anti-nuclear movement

“…Few English-language historians of the cold war mention the Antarctic Treaty except as a minor aberration from the strife which characterised the era (see Powaski 1998: 125; Roberts 1970: 50–51; Young 1993: 41). Though the final terms were innocuous, the negotiation process entailed a high degree of brinkmanship and contingency planning (see Moore 2003–4). It remains unclear if government-employed scientists favoured the possibility of using the continent for nuclear tests, as advocated by the science editor of The New York Times (Sullivan 1954).…”

“…Chilean and Argentine forces were known to be planning a major strike against the British forces stationed on Deception Island (Foreign Office 1953a, 1953b. As much as the United States sought to avoid this scenario and any other which might be exploited by the Soviet Union, the Chileans, Argentines, and British remained more concerned with a reversal of the US nonclaimant policy, which might have added a troublesome new dimension to their own dispute (see Moore 2003).…”

“…It was hoped that by such time, the Anglo–Latin American dispute over the peninsular region would have receded, and the United States’ mediation between the parties would have enhanced what officials viewed as its reputation for impartial leadership (Department of State 1947b). Due to nationalistic sentiments, lingering concerns about the nature of US impartiality, and the outbreak of the Korean War, these objectives were not actively pursued for many years (see Department of State 1948f, 1951; US Navy 1954; Dodds 1996: 83, 2002b: 9: Moore 2003: 71–73).…”

“…In recent years, that perspective has been cast into doubt (Moore 2001, 2003), and herein it is further challenged. At the 1959 Antarctic Conference in Washington, Soviet representatives insisted that an Argentine proposal to ban certain types of nuclear tests be carried further; they insisted on an comprehensive nuclear test ban (Foreign Office 1959a, 1959b), which the United States initially opposed since, as rumored and repeatedly denied (Department of State 1955b, 1956a, 1956b), it hoped to reserve the right to test nuclear weapons in the far south (Department of State 1959f).…”