Tethered to an iceberg: United States policy toward the Antarctic, 1939–1949

During the Second World War, both Chile and Argentina advanced sovereignty claims to the Antarctic Peninsula and surrounding sub-Antarctic islands that overlapped substantially with claims that the United Kingdom had made in 1908 and 1917. This article explores the emergence of the concept of a South American Antarctica during this period. Although, at one level, the two South American countries attempted to create a united front against the British, they actually decided to press their claims to Antarctica for different and sometimes conflicting reasons. In Argentina, nationalists connected the question of sovereignty in Antarctica with their claims to the Malvinas and with a broader struggle against a supposed British economic imperialism. In Chile, patriotic officials were less concerned with British claims to the Antarctic Peninsula and more worried about Argentina's growing interest in the region. The article concludes that a better understanding of the complex and contradictory history of the emergence of the idea of South American Antarctica during the Second World War leads to an enhanced appreciation of the subsequent development of the so-called ‘Antarctic Problem’ as it developed over the next 15 years. In order to avoid the artificiality of the term ‘Falklands (Malvinas)’, the British terms ‘Falklands’ and ‘Falkland Islands’ have been used when discussing the United Kingdom's position, and the Argentine term ‘Malvinas’ when discussing that of Argentina.

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Outbreak Of War and The Byrd Expedition 1939-1940mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Outbreak Of War and The Byrd Expeditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Outbreak Of War and The Byrd Expeditionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Icy relations: the emergence of South American Antarctica during the Second World War

Howkins

2006

A ‘sort’ of self-denial: United States policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–59

Moore¹

2001

United States policy toward the Antarctic in the 1950s culminated in the treaty that bears the continent's name — the same treaty that continues to govern relations in the far south. Washington succeeded in promoting the admirable objectives of scientific advancement and international cooperation. In doing so, it also forfeited what many officials believed to be the more important objective of formalizing a national sovereignty claim to halt further erosion of the rights associated with its mammoth expeditions. Trapped by having repeated their non-claimancy, nonrecognition policy, which Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes had announced in 1924, US officials scrambled for alternatives. They finally chose to formalize their policy-making paralysis, rather than a claim, by proposing a treaty that called for a political status quo moratorium, in accord with the Chilean Escudero Plan. That decision impressed some experts as unwise, but it was sufficiently expedient to win the signatures needed for ratification.

Bungled publicity: Little America, big America, and the rationale for non-claimancy, 1946–61

Moore

2004

Self Cite

Although indispensable for hastening the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, United States policy entailed contradictions that jeopardised its domestic ratification. Many senators opposed their government's adherence to the Hughes Doctrine of 1924, requiring sovereignty claims to be based on occupation rather than exploration. US exploration, they knew, had covered more territory than the combined total of the seven nation-states that already had declared their rights based on criteria other than occupation. The Department of State appreciated that public opinion, whether related to Antarctica, the Cold War, or both, might generate congressional pressure to reverse the non-claimant stance and thereby derail the 12-power negotiations even before they reached the conference stage. This article presents evident and hypothetical consequences of policymakers' refusal to address this dilemma, the likelihood of which accompanied an increasingly pro-claimant stance among journalists, as well as the personal exasperation of Admiral Richard E. Byrd.