How does co-optation of oppositional party elites influence their protest behavior in times of cross-societal protest mobilization? Rational-Choice theories of authoritarian stability postulate that opposition elites receive material incentives in parliaments that motivate them to demobilize their radical supporters, which leads to increased regime stability. Based on a novel dataset, this article examines the protest behavior of the Russian parliamentary opposition parties (the CPRF, the LDPR and JR) and their activists during the protest wave of 2011/12 as a function of each party's co-optation in the regional parliaments. Co-optation is measured by the number of leadership posts that a party holds in the regional legislature. Protest mobilization is captured by (1) the number of protest events organized by each party and (2) the aggregate number of party activists present at protest events per region. The results show clear differences between the parties: Whereas the protest behavior of the communist CPRF is not influenced by regional elite co-optation, the analysis shows negative correlations for the LDPR and JR. The results suggest that co-optation may indeed be effective in reducing protest in contentious times-but that its effect varies for different actors.

The authors compare civil society development in Russia and Ukraine in recent years in terms of civil society’s structure and relationships with the state and the broader society. They find major differences in 1) the treatment of civil society by state actors and 2) the level of trust placed in civil society by the population. They use these and other findings to assess civil society’s ability to play economic, political and social roles as defined by Michael Edwards in Civil Society (Edwards, 2009) and discover important differences emerging with regard to the political and social roles.

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Under what conditions do nation-wide mass protests in authoritarian regimes produce new local activist organizations? Based on sixty-five interviews and over 1,000 media reports, internal documents, and social media posts, I compare the organization-building process in the “For Fair Elections” (FFE) protests of 2011–2012 across four Russian regions. I argue that mass protests are more likely to leave behind new social movement organizations (SMOs) when the local and the national interact, i.e., when long-standing activists on the ground perceive an opportunity to use the protests for their ongoing local struggles. Where new SMOs are established, their composition, activity pattern, and inner structure follow the tactical and organizational repertoires of veteran activists that were shaped by their local political environments. This argument illuminates the functioning of electoral authoritarian regimes from a subnational perspective and identifies conditions under which a bottom-up challenge to an authoritarian political system can drive local civil society development.

This final chapter begins by charting developments following Navalny’s return to Russia in 2021: his detention, sentencing to time in jail, the protests these moves triggered, and his early days in a prison colony. The chapter then steps back, drawing together and reflecting on the different dimensions covered in individual chapters, including asking whether Navalny has achieved what he wanted in politics. The chapter also reflects on a number of questions raised in the book: Is Navalny a revolutionary? Is he a true democrat, a populist—or even a racist? The chapter concludes that the evolution of authoritarianism in Russia shows that the Kremlin takes Navalny and his movement extremely seriously. The chapter finally discusses the role the West could play in Navalny’s fate—and concludes that it will be limited: Navalny’s future will be decided in Russia.

This research note introduces a new social media poll of supporters of Russian opposition politician Aleksei Navalny, conducted during his presidential campaign in 2017-2018. Borrowing items from nationally representative surveys, we present respondents' sociodemographics, political positions, and campaign experiences, differentiating between offline activists and online followers. We then discuss limitations and possible future applications of the data and conclude by stressing the value of social media-based surveys of opposition campaign supporters.

How do opposition actors in electoral authoritarian regimes use social media to galvanize support? Based on 2,229 social media posts, I examine how Aleksey Navalny and the Communist Party (KPRF) politicize grievances about the pension reform of 2018 and use Twitter and VKontakte for protest mobilization. I find that Navalny integrates the reform in his narrative of government corruption and theft, strategically using the platforms' different advantages. The KPRF frames less coherently and makes no distinction between VKontakte and Twitter. These differences, I argue, are mainly due to actors' different target audiences and their respective position in the authoritarian political system