We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.
Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies. * Tilburg University. We appreciate comments from
Accounting innovations are often not successfully implemented or diffused throughout the organization. This study seeks to explain this phenomenon. One of the major impediments to the successful implementation of accounting innovation is that management accounting systems are generally used to serve the decision control needs of top management while at the same time purportedly supporting the decision management needs of lower level managers. To the extent that the accounting system is used for decision control, innovation creates the potential for wealth effects to occur. This prompts managers, whose wealth will be negatively affected, to resist accounting innovation. We present conditions where it is likely for negative wealth effects to occur. Under these conditions the system will fail to achieve its intended objectives. Our theoretical model examines how decentralization choices influence resistance to accounting innovation. We argue that delegation of decision rights can limit the potential for resistance in two ways-(a) by creating the environment which allows managers to ensure that their subunits are able to adapt to the new signals provided by accounting innovations and (b) by enabling subunit managers to become involved in the design of these systems. Our model also enables us to assess the consequences on organizational outcomes when subunit managers resist accounting innovations. Based on data collected from production managers, our results demonstrate the importance of decentralization choices on the effective implementation of accounting innovations.Top managements implement new management accounting systems (MAS) as they believe these systems will improve the performance of the firm. They are often wrong. There is increasing evidence that management accounting innovations do not improve either decision making or firm performance (Kaplan, 1986;Bruns, 1987;Innes and Mitchell, 1991;Cooper et al. , 1992; Scapens and Roberts, M argaret A. A
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