Abstract. This paper studies the role of an organization's accounting control system (ACS) as part of an interrelated control “package,” in which other control systems function either as substitutes or complements. Drawing on resource dependence and institutional theories, it argues that this control mix is not only contingent on the organization's technical environment but also on its institutional environment. In addition, the paper draws on empirical evidence to demonstrate how the design of the “package” is actively shaped by the strategic choices of its dominant coalition. The empirics are based on a longitudinal field study of one large, public teaching hospital in Australia that underwent material changes in its governance structure, culture, and accounting control system.
Résumé. Les auteurs étudient le rôle du système de contôle comptable d'une organisation, à titre d'élément d'une « famille » de systèmes de contrôle reliés entre eux à l'intérieur de Iaquelle les autres systèmes de contrôle jouent le rôle de substituts ou de compléments. S'inspirant de la théorie de la dépendance des ressources et de la théorie institutionnelle, ils affirment que cette combinaison de systèmes n'est pas seulement tributaire de l'environnement technique de l'organisation, mais de son environnement institutionnel. Ils se fondent, en outre, sur des constatations empiriques pour démontrer comment la structure de la « famille » de systèmes est activement façonnée par les choix stratégiques du groupe dominant. Les données empiriques proviennent d'une étude longitudinale sur le terrain, menée auprès d'un important hôpital public universitaire australien dont la structure de régie, la culture et le système de contrôle comptable ont connu des transformations majeures.
The limitations of formal administrative controls in organizations performing complex production tasks have created the need for less obtrusive forms of management control. When formal administrative controls cannot cater to the unpredictability of complex work demands, one strategy is to employ "professionals" who have been trained to cope with these demands and whose behaviour is primarily controlled through social and self-control mechanisms. There is some question, however, as to the effectiveness of this strategy. There is evidence that integrating pmfessionals into bureaucratic organizations creates the potential for a "clash of cultures". Conflict emerges when salaried professionals engage in behaviour directed towards increasing their own autonomy (or in some cases maintaining it) and management implement control systems designed to control that bebaviour. This paper argues that the degree of conflict experienced will depend on the individual role orientation of the professional and the extent to which management confront professionals with bureaucratic administrative systems which restricf their self-regulatory activities. The study was undertaken in a large public teaching hospital in Australia and the results support the theoretical position taken in the paper.Accountants concerned with the management processes which operate within organizations of complex organizations need a "wider vision" (Hopwood, 1976). Nowhere is this more of control and an understanding of the interplay important than in human service organizations between the administrative controls they often where core production activities are dominated design and implement, and the informal cdntrol by professionals. ' Professionals are employed in
We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.
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