This article examines the revival of adat (custom) in post-Suharto Indonesia, a movement which few Indonesia-watchers predicted. Four general reasons for the rise of adat revivalism are identified. The first is the support, both ideological and concrete, of international organizations and networks committed to the rights of indigenous peoples. The second is the uncertainty, together with the opportunities, attendant on the processes of democratization and decentralization which followed the end of Suharto's authoritarian rule. The third is the oppression of marginal population groups under the New Order. The fourth root is historical, having to do with the positive role which adat has played in the country's political imagination since the beginning of Indonesian nationalism. Adat as a political cause involves a set of loosely related ideals which, rightly or wrongly, are associated with the past: authenticity, community, order, and justice. These ideals have been invoked in varying proportions to pursue a wide variety of political ends, including the control of resources and the exclusion of rivals as well as the protection, empowerment, and mobilization of underprivileged groups.

The preeminent feature of the post-Suharto Indonesian state is its extensive and intensive regional violence. Few observers have been surprised by the locations in which the worst of this violence has erupted. Three of these were home to long standing rebellions against Indonesian rule. Aceh, the last territory subdued by the Dutch and home to a long-term, albeit low-intensity, independence movement, is now site of daily arson attacks and armed clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement. East Timor, brutally invaded and annexed by Indonesia in 1975, was the site of massive violence both before and after the August 1999 referendum, through which it achieved independence. Irian Jaya, invaded by the Indonesian military in 1962 and integrated into the republic via a sham UN-sponsored "act of free choice" in 1969, is now experiencing ceremonial raisings of the independence movement's Morning Star flag, demonstrations, and riots. Although the Maluku islands' history of separatism pre-dating the Suharto era differs from the histories of the other territories noted here, the Maluku islands have also been rocked by serious inter-ethnic/religious violence that has left thousands dead and many more displaced. In each of these regions political violence erupted where local aspirations for independence have been quashed by the harsh combination of military rule and economic developmentalism.

No abstract

List offigures page viii List ofmaps ix Listoftables x Acknozvledgments xi Note on currency and lengths xiii Abbreviations and glossary xiv

No abstract

Of the many cases of regional strife in post-Suharto Indonesia, few match the complexity of West Kalimantan, an outlying province rich in ethnic heterogeneity and natural resources. Forms of violence in West Kalimantan fit neither the category of massive regional violence: non-separatist strife that first exploded in the post-Suharto state (Maluku Islands, Poso and Central Kalimantan) nor separatist-related violence suffered over the course of the New Order (Aceh, Papua and Timor), which, not incidentally, then intensified following Suharto's fall. Only West Kalimantan experienced sustained, non-separatist violence that traversed the entirety of the New Order. In this way, this case complicates claims that Indonesia's current regional violence is merely an outcome of the instability of the incipient post-Suharto state, or that regional bloodshed under the New Order was but a by-product of separatism. In particular, this article examines the rise of ethno-political movements in West Kalimantan that grew out of two recent incidents of widespread civilian violence: the 1997 Madurese–Dayak riots and the Malay (and later Dayak)–Madurese episode of 1999. In this analysis, three interlocking mechanisms come to the fore. The first two are the specificity of local historical trajectories and the politicization of ethnicity. The third mechanism is the complex interplay between élites, with the routinization of violence among belligerents in the sparking of upheaval. Although these ethno-political revitalizations purport ‘local’ orientations, broader, national processes have also provided the opportunities and space essential for their dynamism to flourish.

No abstract

This article explores to what extent to local pro-reform actors matter in Indonesia through the prism of anti-corruption campaigns in the country's regions. I argue that the rash of anti-corruption campaigns and related trials involving legislative members, especially from mid-2004 onward, can be attributed neither to the resources lavished on anti-corruption organizations based in Jakarta, nor to the popularity of President Yudhoyono's anti-corruption rhetoric. Instead, it can be traced to a particular anti-corruption campaign that began in earnest in 2002 in Padang, West Sumatra. Using a multi-dimensional approach, a small group of activists relentlessly pursued their newly elected provincial legislators to be accountable to their democratic mandates and as important, to respect the rule of law pursuant to new national anti-corruption legislation. The guilty verdicts of May 2004 galvanized similar groups across the country to investigate their respective legislative bodies. This exemplary case of societal accountability also demonstrated the leverage activists can gain over local politicians when they forge coalitions with other elite actors, especially those in Jakarta. I further explore two anti-corruption cases in the province of West Kalimantan to place post-Padang developments in their proper perspective. If hopes were raised that regional anti-corruption movements-based on the Padang model-might accomplish more than sensational trials but help consolidate democracy at the regional level by holding elected officials accountable, these two examples show how fleeting these expectations might be.