The preeminent feature of the post-Suharto Indonesian state is its extensive and intensive regional violence. Few observers have been surprised by the locations in which the worst of this violence has erupted. Three of these were home to long standing rebellions against Indonesian rule. Aceh, the last territory subdued by the Dutch and home to a long-term, albeit low-intensity, independence movement, is now site of daily arson attacks and armed clashes between the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement. East Timor, brutally invaded and annexed by Indonesia in 1975, was the site of massive violence both before and after the August 1999 referendum, through which it achieved independence. Irian Jaya, invaded by the Indonesian military in 1962 and integrated into the republic via a sham UN-sponsored "act of free choice" in 1969, is now experiencing ceremonial raisings of the independence movement's Morning Star flag, demonstrations, and riots. Although the Maluku islands' history of separatism pre-dating the Suharto era differs from the histories of the other territories noted here, the Maluku islands have also been rocked by serious inter-ethnic/religious violence that has left thousands dead and many more displaced. In each of these regions political violence erupted where local aspirations for independence have been quashed by the harsh combination of military rule and economic developmentalism.
Six months after the historic August 1999 referendum in which the people of East Timor voted to reject Indonesia's offer of broad autonomy, the newly appointed chief of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, commented to CNN on the enormous challenge of setting the territory on the road to independence: ‘It is a test case, therefore it is even a laboratory case where we can transform utopia into reality. But I think we can try and get it right in the case of Timor.’ After 24 years of brutal military occupation, the suggestion that East Timor was to be a laboratory case for the United Nations might have seemed insulting, the notion of utopia absurd. Hundreds of thousands of people were without housing. Basic infrastructure lay in ruins. Commodities were scarce and those goods available were sold at grossly inflated prices. Eleven thousand foreign troops had arrived to restore security. Tens of thousands of refugees were still living in squalid camps across the border in Indonesian West Timor, many against their will. Nevertheless, Vieira de Mello's statement neatly captured the twin aspirations of the time — the independence long-dreamed of by East Timorese and the opportunity for the United Nations literally to build a state from the ground up. In the same CNN report, East Timorese Nobel Laureate José Ramos-Horta emphasised precisely this point: ‘This is the first instance in the history of the UN that the UN has managed completely an entire country; and they have a [Timorese pro-independence] movement that is very cooperative, they have an exceptional people that's cooperating with them, so they cannot fail. They are condemned to succeed because failure would be disastrous for the credibility of the UN, so they simply cannot afford to fail.’ Utopia, it seems, had become a necessity.
This article examines the importance of the internal structural dynamics of the military in the analysis of transitions from nondemocratic rule and in democratic consolidation. The authors argues that factors endogenous to the military—including variations in the size of the officer corps, solidarity among graduating classes from the military academy, and promotional prospects—are important determinants of the political behavior of militaries. As a case study, military structure and politics during Indonesia's recent transition from nondemocratic rule and current consolidation of democracy are explored in detail. While the ongoing interaction between civilians and the military is acknowledged, systematic structural features are identified as being important for understanding the behavior of the Indonesian military between 1998 and 2001. The authors compare and contrast the study of Indonesia with other cases in the literature on transitions—including Ghana, Nigeria, Portugal, and Thailand—and discuss resulting implications for the study of transitions and consolidations.
In 2006, a mere seven years after the overwhelming vote in opposition to Indonesia's final offer of 'broad autonomy' and only four years after the restoration of independence, communal violence erupted in Dili, the capital of East Timor. This violence was framed in terms of tensions between westerners, known as kaladi, and easterners, known as firaku. This essay seeks to answer two basic puzzles. First, what are the origins of these communal labels? Second, why did these terms resonate so profoundly within East Timorese society so soon after independence? Tracing the history of these terms, this essay argues that across more than three centuries these communal labels have emerged during crucial struggles to exert central authority. In doing so, this essay highlights the relationship between regional identities and the social ecology of food.
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