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Because current management theories evolved in the context of brick-and-mortar firms, this paper examines three key questions raised by the advent of e-business: (1) Will the strategy types found among e-business firms resemble Porter’s (1980) generic strategies? (2) Will we find performance differences among e-business firms pursuing different types of strategies? (3) Will we find differences in the strategy-performance relationships of pure online firms (pure plays) and firms with both online and offline operations (clicks-and-bricks)? We conclude that integrated strategies that combine elements of cost leadership and differentiation will outperform cost leadership or differentiation strategies. We also argue that, regardless of business strategy type, clicks-and-bricks firms that closely integrate their on-and offline operations will enjoy performance advantages over their pure play counterparts.

This study explores the effects of regulation and deregulation on strategic choice and performance in the U.S. banking industry. Drawing on literature from strategic management, industrial organization economics, and organization theory, we develop a framework which suggests that regulatory scope and regulatory incrementalism influence strategic choice and performance. A path analytic model is used to empirically examine these influences. The results suggest that deregulation has direct effcts on firms' strategic choices and both direct and indirect effects on risk and return.Strategic management, organization theory, and industrial organization economics researchers have hypothesized that government regulation will affect strategic choice and performance (e.g. Andrews, 1971;Scherer, 1980; Ungson, James, and Spicer, 1985;Cook, et al., 1983). Despite the pervasiveness of regulation and the critical role of strategic choice in determining firm performance, the intersection of strategic choice and regulation has been largely ignored.These issues are increasing in importance because of two major trends: globalization and deregulation. As industries globalize, firms that historically competed in a particular regulatory context begin to look beyond their borders and face new competitors. Competitors that developed strategies and strategic capabilities

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This paper presents two studies that examine the commonly held belief that corporate boards are more likely to have positive eects on organizational performance when composed of outside directors. The ®rst study ± a meta-analysis of 63 correlations ± indicates that, on average, the greater presence of outsiders is associated with higher performance, but so too is the greater presence of insiders. Instead of providing evidence of a positive outsider eect, these results suggest the existence of a curvilinear homogeneity eect in which performance is enhanced by the greater relative presence of either inside or outside directors. The second study ± a hierarchical polynomial regression analysis of data from 259 large US companies ± con®rms the existence of a curvilinear relationship between insider/ outsider composition and performance measured as return on assets.

In this study, chief executive officers were surveyed to evaluate how they perceive their firms’ businesses to be related. Responses from nearly 200 top executives provided the data for this study. Findings suggest that some managers think of relatedness in terms of similarities in products, markets, and technologies, a type of relatedness that is assessed by existing measures of diversification. The study also found, however, that managers hold additional conceptualizations of relatedness, including relatedness characterized by an emphasis on shared differentiation and marketing skills. The importance of the study’s findings and its contributions to the diversification literature are discussed. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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