Theories about institution-building episodes emphasize either rational or social and cultural elements. Our research on the Single Market Program (SMP) of the European Union (EU) shows that both elements are part of the process. When the EU was caught in a stalemate, the European Commission devised the SMP. The commission worked within the constraints of existing institutional arrangements, provided a "cultural frame," and helped create an elite social movement. This examination of the SMP legislation, using an institutional approach to the sociology of markets, shows how the commission was able to do this by trading off the interests of important state and corporate actors. 1 An earlier version of this article was prepared for the meeting of the European Community Studies Association in Washington, D.C., May 1993. We have benefited from comments given at a presentation at the Center for Western European Studies at Stanford University. We would also like to thank Richard Lempert, Doug McAdam, Andrew Moravcsik, and Richard Swedberg for comments. We have also been helped by comments from the AJS reviewers.

Growing concern about the impact of drug abuse and the proliferation of drug-related caseloads in urban courts has fueled interest in urine screening and monitoring programs to detect drug use among pretrial defendants. Research on the predictive utility of urine tests in New York City and elsewhere suggests that this information does not improve the ability to classify high-risk offenders, nor does urine monitoring appear to reduce pretrial misconduct under supervised release programs. Coupled with technical and process concerns surrounding drug tests, the evidence thus far suggests caution in the adoption of pretrial drug-testing programs.