The problem of the relationship between actors and the social structures in which they are embedded is central to sociological theory. This paper suggests that the "new institutionalist" focus on fields, domains, or games provides an alternative view of how to think about this problem by focusing on the construction of local orders. This paper criticizes the conception of actors in both rational choice and sociological versions of these theories. A more sociological view of action, what is called "social skill", is developed. The idea of social skill originates in symbolic interactionism and is defined as the ability to induce cooperation in other. This idea is elaborated to suggest how actors are important to the construction and reproduction of local orders. I show how its elements already inform existing work.Finally, I show how the idea can sensitize scholars to the role of actors in empirical work.

In recent years there has been an outpouring of work at the intersection of social movement studies and organizational theory. While we are generally in sympathy with this work, we think it implies a far more radical rethinking of structure and agency in modern society than has been realized to date. In this article, we offer an over brief sketch of a general theory of strategic action fields (SAF). We begin with a discussion of the main elements of the theory, describe the broader environment of fields in which any given SAF is embedded, consider the dynamics of stability and change in SAFs, and end with an extended example intended to illustrate how adoption of our perspective would fundamentally change the interpretation of one of the more consequential "episodes of contention"-the civil rights revolution-to take place in the U.S. over the past 50 years.

No abstract

I use the metaphor "markets as politics" to create a sociological view of action in markets. I develop a conceptual view of the social institutions that comprise markets, discuss a sociological model of action in which market participants try to create stable worlds and find social solutions to competition, and discuss how markets and states are intimately linked. From these foundations, I generate propositions about how politics in markets work during various stages of market development-formation, stability, and transformation. At the formation of markets, when actors in firms are trying to create a status hierarchy that enforces noncompetitive forms of competition, political action resembles social movements. In stable markets, incumbent firms defend their positions against challengers and invaders. During periods of market transformation, invaders can reintroduce more fluid social-movement-like conditions.

The problem of the role of actors in institutional theory can be addressed in considering a model of institutional entrepreneurship. A sociological posing of this question defines institutional entrepreneurs as actors who have social skills, that is, the ability to motivate cooperation of other actors by providing them with common meanings and identities. The author argues that skill is applied differently across organizational fields that are forming, become stable, and are being transformed. To illustrate some of these principles, the author considers the example of the role of Jacques Delors in the framing of the Single Market Program of the European Union.