Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does corporate governance explain US bank performance during the period leading up to the financial crisis? We adopt the factor structure by Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of corporate governance for 236 public commercial banks. Research Findings/Insights: Findings reveal corporate governance factors explain financial performance better than loan quality. We find strong support for a negative association between leverage and both financial performance and loan quality. CEO duality is negatively associated with financial performance. The extent of executive incentive pay is positively associated with financial performance but exhibits a negative association with loan quality in the long-run. We find a concave relationship between financial performance and both board size and average director age. We provide weak evidence of an association of anti-takeover devices, board meeting frequency, and affiliated nature of committees with financial performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the banking industry and expect that the governanceperformance linkage might differ due to the unique regulatory and business environment. Results extend Larcker et al. (2007), especially regarding the concave relationship between board size and performance, and the role of leverage. Given the lack of support for our agency theory predictions, we suggest that alternative theories are needed to understand the performance implications of corporate governance at banks. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer contributions to regulators, especially for ongoing financial reforms of capital requirements and executive compensation. Specifically, we show a consistent negative association between leverage and performance, which supports the current debate on Tier I capital limits for banks.

Using agency theory, we explore the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and bank risk. We employ panel data analysis to study the 97 largest European listed banks between 2006 and 2010, thereby covering the most recent international financial crisis. The results show that corporate governance mechanisms influence bank risk. During the financial crisis, different governance mechanisms can minimise or accentuate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. In our model, bank size and G.D.P. per capita also exert a considerable influence.

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For improved corporate governance in this age of digitalization, the Board of Directors could investigate key operating performance indicators or KPIs for competitive advantages with Digitalization Dashboards. There are over 30 such digital metrics in the Digitalization Dashboard example in this paper. A starting point for developing such key metrics could be the digital values indicated by the “efficient stock market” with the market to book ratio calculation. The ten “new economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 10.85 while the ten “old economy” companies had an average market to book ratio of 2.64. Why are sophisticated investors indicating that the equity market value or market capitalization of “new economy” companies is almost eleven times larger on average than their equity book value? Why is the average market to book ratio of “new economy” companies over four times larger than for “old economy” companies? What key digitalization metrics and competitive advantages are in play here? Digital dashboards are recommended here to answer such questions. While the awareness on boards regarding risks originating from disruptive innovation, cyber threats and privacy risks has been increasing, board members must equally be able to challenge executives and identify opportunities and threats for their companies. This shift for companies is not only about digital technology but also cultural. How can people be managed when digital, virtual ways of working are increasing? What do robotics and “big data” analysis mean for managing people? One way to accelerate the digital learning process has been advocated: the use of digital apprentices for boards. For example, Board Apprentice, a non-profit organization, has already placed digital apprentices on boards for a year-long period (which helps to educate both apprentices and boards) in five different countries.

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IntroductionBeginning with initial applications in the 1980s, benchmarking has reached widespread diffusion and is now considered among the most powerful tools for promoting process improvements and re-engineering in companies (Leibfried and McNair, 1992;Zairi and Leonard, 1994;Zairi, 1996). The external focus of benchmarking has helped companies break with the tradition of internal, incremental performance targets and measures. Efforts have focused on designing effective and efficient organisational benchmarking processes, including such critical issues as the identification of the processes to be compared, the identification of best performers and the selection of benchmarking partners, the establishment of a benchmarking team, the organisation and management of site visits, the identification of data to be collected and analysed, the communication of performance gaps, and the enactment of the change process suggested by benchmarking (Camp, 1989;Spendolini, 1992).These organisational design aspects of the benchmarking process are crucial to the success of the project. However, in our view there are at least four methodological issues critical to the success of benchmarking projects that have not yet been adequately analysed. These four methodological issues are:(1) how to define the performance measures;(2) how to achieve comparability of performances;(3) how to identify best practices;(4) how to evaluate the transferability of best practices. Strategies are developed to solve these benchmarking issues or problems in the following four sections of this paper. Then, these strategies are summarised in the components of a benchmarking model linking performances and best practices. These conceptual issues and strategies, as well as the empirical evidence in this paper, are grounded on a benchmarking project on accounting processes promoted and managed by CESAD (Centro Studi di Amministrazione e Direzione di Impresa), the research centre on accounting and management of Bocconi University, Milan. This ongoing project named Excellence in Finance

In March 2008, the US government bailed out a failing Bear Stearns by arranging a sale to JP Morgan Chase, with US government guarantees for many Bear Stearns’ toxic assets that came with the acquisition. In September 2008, the US government failed to bail out a failing Lehman Brothers, which then went into bankruptcy. Soon thereafter, the US government established a bailout program for many other failing financial institutions. This paper uses financial risk and fraud models to attempt to answer the question as to why Bear Stearns was bailed out, but Lehman Brothers was not. Based on the analysis, was the right or wrong firm bailed out? In summary, these financial risk and fraud models show potential for developing effective risk management monitoring and stronger corporate governance in order to enhance relationships between management, financial reporting, and the stability of the economic system in crisis and post-crisis conditions.

Stakeholder capitalism is the notion that a company focuses on meeting the needs of all of its stakeholders: customers, employees, partners, the community, and society as a whole. In August 2019, 183 of the 206 Business Roundtable (BR) companies signed the BR Statement of the Purpose of a Corporation advocating stakeholder capitalism beyond the traditional shareholder capitalism. The major research question of this paper is whether companies who have committed to stakeholder capitalism are fulfilling their commitments and to provide some recommendations to their boards. We closely study the scrutiny from institutional investors and stakeholder capitalism report developed by KKS Advisors and TCP (2020). The findings show that the BR company signatories have failed to deliver fundamental shifts in corporate purpose to stakeholder capitalism (Bebchuk & Tallarita, 2020; Goodman, 2020). However, non-BR companies, primarily public benefit corporations (PBCs) and B corporations, have implemented stakeholder capitalism strategies and offer innovative stakeholder opportunities for corporate governance. The boards of BR companies should advocate for a more affirmative duty to stakeholders and consider converting corporate structures to develop stakeholder capitalism. Future research should continue to investigate this corporate governance opportunity.