Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume's claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume's treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

The inoffensive title of THN 1.4.7, 1 'Conclusion of this Book', belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume's considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The 'usefulness and agreeableness reading' (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified on the basis of their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (1976), Owen (1999), Ridge (2003), Kail (2005), and McCormick (2005, while Schafer (forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. 2 In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justificationa distinction that Hume insists on in claiming that 'Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable' (THN 3.1.1.10). 3 Hume seems to take the sceptical arguments of THN 1.4.7 as leaving no trace of epistemic justification whatsoever in its wake, yet he seems to treat some beliefs as epistemically justified; this means that the justificatory arguments of THN 1.4.7 (the only time he addresses these sceptical arguments in the 1 In references to Hume's texts throughout the paper, 'THN' refers to the Treatise of Human Nature, 'EHU' to the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 'EPM' to the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and 'EMPL' to Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Arabic numerals refer to section and paragraph numbers (EHU and EPM), or to book, part, section, and paragraph numbers (THN). EMPL numbers refer to pages in the Miller revised edition of the Essays (Liberty Fund Inc., 1987). 2 There are of course differences among these accounts; for example, Ridge emphasises immediate agreeableness to oneself, while McCormick emphasises usefulness to society. 3 I do not wish to substantively define epistemic normativity in this paper on pain of begging the question against U&A. I will only roughly characterise it (hopefully uncontroversially) as the primary kind of evaluation to which beliefs are subject that determines their philosophical legitimacy.

Here is a central issue in Hume scholarship: What is the relationship between Hume’s early Treatise of Human Nature and his later Enquiry concerning Human Understanding? Is the Enquiry a mere simplified restatement of the contents of the Treatise, or do the two substantially differ? Here is another critical issue in Hume scholarship: What is the relationship between Hume’s scepticism and his naturalism? How can we reconcile Hume’s extreme brand of scepticism with his positive ambitions of providing an account of human nature? Hume’s Epistemological Evolution argues that these two issues are intimately related. In particular, this book argues that Hume’s Enquiry indeed differs from the Treatise, precisely because he changes his response to scepticism between the two works. Because the Treatise has as its primary focus the psychological naturalistic project, its treatment of epistemological issues arises unsystematically from the psychological investigation. Consequently, Hume finds himself forced into an unsatisfactory response to scepticism founded on the Title Principle . This response is, however, deeply problematic, as Hume himself seems to recognise. In contrast to the Treatise, the Enquiry emphasises the epistemological aspects of Hume’s project, and offers a radically different and more sophisticated epistemology. This framework addresses the weaknesses of the earlier one, and also constitutes a ‘compleat answer’ to two of his most prominent critics, Thomas Reid and James Beattie. Hume’s epistemology thus undergoes an evolution between these two works.

Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues (whether normative or descriptive). I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I explain a framework by which he provides what I call consequent justification for our inductive practices in his positive argument. Based on this, I argue that his negative argument in the Enquiry should similarly be read as normative in nature.

Much has been written about Kemp Smith's (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith's problem from the standpoint of Hume's treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume's discussion in EHU 12, and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole. Moreover, it is one that is of substantive philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts.