Hume's Positive Argument on Induction

Qu, Hsueh

doi:10.1111/nous.12015

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…30 Hume here is addressing the concerns of readers who are worried about the scope of the scepticism of Section 4: he notes that his brand of academical philosophy will not 'carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation'-which is to say, it does carry doubts in the first place. Second, having denied induction any justification sourcing from reason in Section 4, Hume looks to address any profound sceptical implications by offering an alternative source of justification: 'If the mind be not engaged by argument to 29 I also discuss these issues in (Qu, 2014a) and (Qu, 2020, Ch.4).…”

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Normative interpretations include (Winkler, 1999), (Loeb, 2006), (Loeb, 2008), (Millican, 1995), (Millican, 2002), (Qu, 2014a), and (Dimech, Forthcoming). I have suggested that the Treatise's version is descriptive while the Enquiry's is normative in (Qu, 2020, Chs.3-4), but I bracket this issue for the purposes of this paper.…”

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hume's epistemological legacy is often perceived as a predominantly negative sceptical one. His infamous problem of induction continues to perplex philosophers to this day, and many of his sceptical worries maintain their interest in contemporary eyes (e.g. with regard to reason, the senses, substance, causation). Yet Hume's positive epistemological contributions also hold significance for philosophy in this day and age. In this paper, I aim to situate Hume's epistemology in a more contemporary context, particularly with regard to the theme of reliabilism that runs throughout this epistemology. This will take the shape of examining correspondences and contrasts between Hume's epistemologies in the Treatise and Enquiry and reliabilism, as well as an examination of how Hume's framework might handle some major challenges for reliabilist epistemologies. In particular, I argue that that while Hume is tempted to an epistemology that is intimately tied to truth in the Treatise, he backs away when confronted with the excesses of scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1, and winds up with an epistemology most similar to the contemporary epistemological frameworks of dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. Yet, largely because of his reliance on the passions (a respect in which he diverges from these two contemporary frameworks), the epistemology of the Treatise remains crucially dissociated from truth. Meanwhile, in the first Enquiry, he proceeds to develop a two-tiered epistemological framework that first accords all our justification with default authority, and then founds all-things-considered epistemic justification on our evidence for the reliability of our faculties. The first tier most resembles the contemporary epistemological framework of conservatism, while the second tier most closely resembles approved-list reliabilism. In this, a clear reliabilist thread runs through the epistemology of the Enquiry. I will also argue that although Hume did not appear to fully appreciate one of the most significant challenges for reliabilism-that is, the generality problem-his philosophical framework nevertheless contains the beginnings of a response to it.

show abstract

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Millican ), or merely bringing in EHU 12 as a supplement (e.g. Winkler ; Qu ). All in all, it seems that Section 12 has been unduly neglected.…”

Section: Hume's Scepticism and Naturalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… In my Qu (, p. 28, fn. 48), I suggest that perhaps the Title Principle in THN 1.4.7 might have analogies with Pryor's dogmatism, since according to the Title Principle, what justifies our beliefs seems to be a phenomenological fact (i.e.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…This suggests an account of how inductive beliefs are justified for Hume—although we can give no reason for the Uniformity Principle, the principle is nevertheless justified, because it issues from custom, which has first default justification, and then consequent justification once it reflectively assesses itself. I address the issue of circularity in the next section, and also discuss it in my Qu ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Hume's Internalist Epistemology inEHU 12

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much has been written about Kemp Smith's (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has been unduly neglected. This paper seeks to address Kemp Smith's problem from the standpoint of Hume's treatment of scepticism in EHU 12, and finds an interesting internalist account that makes sense both of Hume's discussion in EHU 12, and his aims in the Enquiry as a whole. Moreover, it is one that is of substantive philosophical interest, having intriguing parallels to contemporary epistemological accounts.

show abstract

Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Hume's Positive Argument on Induction

Cited by 8 publications

References 27 publications

Hume and reliabilism

Hume and reliabilism

Hume's Internalist Epistemology inEHU 12

Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About