Hume's Internalist Epistemology in<scp>EHU</scp> 12

Qu, Hsueh

doi:10.1111/phpr.12367

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…This epistemological framework closely resembles a form of what is called 'conservatism' endorsed by Wright. 33 Wright suggests that we might be 31 See my (Qu, 2018b) and (Qu, 2020, Ch.9), which go into more textual depth, although this paper develops the contemporary significance of this text in more detail.…”

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 91%

“…37 As mentioned in the introduction, previously in (Qu, 2018b) and (Qu, 2020, Ch.9), I have maintained that Hume's epistemology in the Enquiry is internalist in character, but I have recently come to appreciate that it has externalist aspects as well. In particular, while my earlier work treated antecedent justification as internalist, I have come to think it is better characterised as externalist, for the reasons given above.…”

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Those that do, go on the list, and beliefs that issue from them are correspondingly deemed justified. 40 (Qu, 2018b), (Qu, 2020, pp.223-224).…”

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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Hume's epistemological legacy is often perceived as a predominantly negative sceptical one. His infamous problem of induction continues to perplex philosophers to this day, and many of his sceptical worries maintain their interest in contemporary eyes (e.g. with regard to reason, the senses, substance, causation). Yet Hume's positive epistemological contributions also hold significance for philosophy in this day and age. In this paper, I aim to situate Hume's epistemology in a more contemporary context, particularly with regard to the theme of reliabilism that runs throughout this epistemology. This will take the shape of examining correspondences and contrasts between Hume's epistemologies in the Treatise and Enquiry and reliabilism, as well as an examination of how Hume's framework might handle some major challenges for reliabilist epistemologies. In particular, I argue that that while Hume is tempted to an epistemology that is intimately tied to truth in the Treatise, he backs away when confronted with the excesses of scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1, and winds up with an epistemology most similar to the contemporary epistemological frameworks of dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. Yet, largely because of his reliance on the passions (a respect in which he diverges from these two contemporary frameworks), the epistemology of the Treatise remains crucially dissociated from truth. Meanwhile, in the first Enquiry, he proceeds to develop a two-tiered epistemological framework that first accords all our justification with default authority, and then founds all-things-considered epistemic justification on our evidence for the reliability of our faculties. The first tier most resembles the contemporary epistemological framework of conservatism, while the second tier most closely resembles approved-list reliabilism. In this, a clear reliabilist thread runs through the epistemology of the Enquiry. I will also argue that although Hume did not appear to fully appreciate one of the most significant challenges for reliabilism-that is, the generality problem-his philosophical framework nevertheless contains the beginnings of a response to it.

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Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Reliabilism In the Enquirymentioning

confidence: 93%

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Hume and reliabilism

Qu¹

2021

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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“… 8 Qu (2018), Wilson (1989; 1985) and Coleman (1988) similarly give sparse attention to tranquillity in their rebuttals of the Pyrrhonian reading of Hume. Livingston (1984) offers an idiosyncratic reading of Hume's rejection of Pyrrhonism, locating it in a wider ‘philosophy of history’.…”

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Hume is the Enemy of Pyrrho

Dimech¹

2021

Philosophy

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I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt.

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Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

Qu¹

2019

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This article surveys the state of the literature on Hume’s epistemology, focusing on treatments of what has come to be known as the “Kemp Smith problem,” that is, the problem of reconciling Hume’s skepticism with his naturalism. It first surveys the literature on this issue with regard to the Treatise, moving on to briefly compare the Treatise and the Enquiry in virtue of their epistemological frameworks, before finally examining the literature with regard to the first Enquiry.

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Hume's Internalist Epistemology inEHU 12

Cited by 3 publications

References 37 publications

Hume and reliabilism

Hume and reliabilism

Hume is the Enemy of Pyrrho

Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question

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