This paper examines the influence of national culture on corporate governance. We postulate that national culture can shape the contracting environments by serving as an informal constraint that affects incentives and choices in corporate governance. We hypothesize that national culture can explain cross-country variations in corporate governance after controlling for legal, political, financial, and economic institutions. We develop a Rule Preference Index as a proxy of national culture for a sample of 12,909 firm-year observations from 41 countries. Employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-level and country-level variables, we find robust evidence that firms (and countries) with a higher Rule Preference Index tend to have better corporate governance.
PurposePrevious literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.Design/methodology/approachIn order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.FindingsEmpirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.Research limitations/implicationsPractical implicationsSocial implicationsOriginality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of investor sentiment on timely loss recognition by examining a sample of firms for the period 1988-2015. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the accruals-based model of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and a sentiment measure in their primary analysis. Supporting analyses include an extension of Simpson (2013) using an abnormal accruals analysis with subsamples of firms with bad news, the use of a Khan and Watts (2009) quarter firm-level measure of conservatism and an investigation of the monitoring role played by financial analysts. Findings The study finds that managers strategically report more losses in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. This loss timing behavior results in an average 37.8 per cent increase in the acceleration of loss recognition. This study additionally finds a negative correlation between investor sentiment and abnormal accruals when managers are reporting bad news, and that a greater number of financial analysts following a firm curtails managers’ acceleration of loss recognition in high sentiment periods. Originality/value This study contributes to the corporate disclosure literature by showing that managers strategically recognize losses, and such behavior is more prevalent in high sentiment periods. Managers take advantage of prevailing investor sentiment to accelerate losses in high sentiment periods to mitigate market penalties from reporting bad news.
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of industry peers in shaping firm debt maturity decisions. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use idiosyncratic equity shocks as instruments to disentangle industry fixed and peer effects. The authors also employ a three-stage least squares regression (3SLS) model to capture the correlation among thee (short, medium, and long) debt maturity decisions. Findings – The authors find that a one standard deviation change in peer short (medium, long) maturity debt leads to a 50 percent (37 percent, 23 percent) change in firm corresponding maturity debt and that these mimetic behaviors are statistically significant within, but not between, firm size groups. The findings also reveal that firms that mimic the short and medium (long) debt maturity structure of their peers tend to increase (decrease) firm performance as measured by profitability, return-on-assets, and stock returns. Research limitations/implications – First, given the research design, the authors are constraint from pinpointing the exact date of the mimicking behaviors. This limitation prevents the authors from establishing the causality of the mimicking behavior and firm performance. Future research can extend the findings by solving this problem. Second, it should be interesting to address the question of whether mimicking behavior is good or bad for firm performance. The authors only compare the performance of Close Followers and Loose Followers; however, it would be more precise to compare the performance of mimicking firms with the performance of non-mimicking firms. Originality/value – First, the findings extend the debt maturity structure literature by providing empirical evidence that an important determinant of firm debt maturity is industry peer debt maturity. Since debt maturity directly influences firm risk and performance, it is important for debt and equity holders to know how firms choose their debt maturity so that they can estimate their investment risk precisely. Second, the paper provides new empirical evidence supporting the information acquisition and principal-agent theories in demonstrating that firm performance increases when managers herd over short and medium debt maturity decisions and decreases when managers herd over long debt maturity decisions.
This study examines whether shareholders use internal governance mechanisms (i.e., manager compensation, shareholder rights protection at firm level) to substitute for weak external governance (i.e., investor protection mechanisms at country level) in restricting earnings management. We find that the impacts of internal governance on earnings management are stronger in countries with weak external governance. Examining the consequence of earnings management on firm performance, we find that internal governance restricts earnings management more efficiently than external governance. This study extends prior literature by quantifying the impacts of internal and external governance on earnings management and firm performance. Our findings suggest that investors should pay more attention to internal governance than to external governance in controlling for earnings management.
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