“…As defined by Johnson and La Porta (2000), tunnelling is the controlling shareholders' malpractice of using dividend payment, related party transactions or other unscrupulous ways to exploit minority shareholders' interest. Based on evidence offered by a vast literature on the subject, large shareholders have the ability to encroach disproportionate interests and redirect resources from companies, severely undermining the firm value in the process (Barclay & Holderness, 1989;Chiou et al, 2010;Gordon & Pound, 1993;Gugler, 2003;Holmen & Knopf, 2004;Ng, 2014;Ngo et al, 2018;Truong & Heaney, 2007). Using CAR to test market reaction in China, Chen et al (2008) discover controlling shareholders' practice of using dividend for tunnelling rather than using it as a tool for signalling or mitigating principal-agent problems.…”