Prior research on publicly traded U.S. firms provides evidence that managers engage in classification shifting to opportunistically manage 'core' earnings. We extend this line of research in a broader international setting, by examining (1) whether the level of investor protection affects managers' decisions to engage in classification shifting behavior and (2) whether coverage by financial analysts mitigates this behavior. Based on an international sample of firms from 40 countries, we observe evidence consistent with classification shifting in both strong and weak investor protection countries using four separate measures of investor protection. We then explore the potential monitoring role of financial analysts in mitigating classification shifting. We provide evidence that higher financial analyst following mitigates classification shifting, primarily in weak investor protection countries. Overall, our results provide evidence of classification shifting in a broad international setting and evidence of financial analysts influence in reducing this form of earnings management.

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The authors study whether managerial ownership and analyst coverage relate to audit fees. To the extent that these corporate governance factors relate to auditor assessment of the firm’s agency costs and hence various risks the auditor must consider in the development of an audit program, they will affect audit effort and hence audit fees. The authors find that managerial equity holdings and analyst coverage are negatively associated with audit fees and that these associations are both statistically and economically significant. On average, a 1% increase in managerial ownership translates into a 0.2% reduction in audit fees. In the low managerial ownership sample (i.e., less than 5% managerial ownership), a 1% increase in the ownership reduces the fees by 1.4%. Similarly, one more analyst following a company reduces audit fees by 9.3%. These results add to the literature on the effects of corporate governance on audit fees.

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PurposePrevious literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.Design/methodology/approachIn order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.FindingsEmpirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.Research limitations/implicationsPractical implicationsSocial implicationsOriginality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

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