Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Supply shocks in the global gas market might affect countries differently since the market is regionally interlinked but not perfectly integrated. Additionally, high supply side concentration might expose countries to market power in different ways. To evaluate the strategic position of importing countries concerning gas supplies we disentangle import prices to price increasing and decreasing factors. Since the interrelations on the global gas market are complex we use an equilibrium model programmed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and simulate the blockage of LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz. This enables us to account for the oligopolistic nature and the asymmetry of the gas supply side. We find that Japan faces the most severe price increases as it completely relies on LNG supply. In contrast, European countries like the UK benefit from a good interconnection to the continental pipeline system and significant domestic price-taking production, both of which help to mitigate an increase in physical costs of supply as well as the exercise of market power.
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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
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AbstractIn this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector. By accounting for household behavior, we find that welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs. Our results are based on a microsimulation of private households' investment decision for heating systems until 2030. The households' investment behavior in the simulation is derived from a discrete choice estimation which allows investigating the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden. We simulate greenhouse gas abatements and welfare costs of carbon taxes and subsidies on heating system investments until 2030 to deduce abatement curves. Given utility maximizing households, our results suggest a carbon tax to be the welfare efficient policy. Assuming behavioral misperceptions instead, a subsidy on investments might have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.
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