To analyze the effect of government reward-penalty policies (RPPs) on the decisions of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), this paper endogenizes government decision variables to maximize social welfare and builds four decision-making models (without RPP, with carbon emission RPP, with recycling amount RPP, and with double RPP) by using a Stackelberg dynamic game between the government and supply chain members. The research results show that, (1) in the four models, there exist optimal prices and reward-penalty coefficients to maximize the supply chain members’ profits and social welfare. (2) Comparing with model W, under most conditions, three government RPPs decrease the demand for new products and increase the demand for remanufactured products. Comparing the case without RPP, R’s profit decreases, and when the carbon emission cap is very big and the lowest recycling amount is very small, M’s profit increases. (3) In most cases, the three government RPPs can effectively control the total carbon emission and increase the social welfare, but they damage the benefits of retailers and consumers. With the increase of the carbon emission intensity of remanufactured products, the government can implement the double RPP, the carbon emission RPP, and the recycling amount RPP in turn.
This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits vertical and horizontal fairness concerns. The manufacturer or the retailer direct selling and e-commerce platform agency selling modes are employed to characterize the impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the online channel mode strategy. Results show that the retailer’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale price and online channel mode strategy. Without the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer direct selling mode is the best strategy for the manufacturer, which harms the retailer’s utility. With the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer may choose the manufacturer direct selling or e-commerce platform agency selling mode. When the fairness concern parameters meet a certain range, the e-commerce platform agency selling mode strategy is better for the supply chain members, which can solve the interest conflict between supply chain members. These research findings help dual-channel supply chain members understand how to choose the channel structure strategy to balance the supply chain members’ interests by considering fairness concerns.
To reduce environmental pollution, the government has issued relevant laws and regulations, and more and more enterprises engage in remanufacturing and recycling used products. Trade old for new and trade old for remanufactured have become marketing means to promote product recycling. The extended warranty service is used to promote the recycling of waste products. To design an optimal extended warranty service strategy and analyze its environment impact in a remanufactured supply chain, game theory is used to model the competitive relationship between a manufacturer and an E-commerce platform. Considering whether the E-commerce platform provides extended warranty service, four models are constructed, and the extended warranty service strategy and its environment impact can be analyzed. The results show that, when the level of substitutability between remanufactured and new products meets a certain rage, new or remanufactured products with extended warranty service strategy can increase the demand for new or remanufactured products, respectively. In the four models, the changing trends of manufacturer’s profit, E-commerce platform’s profit and supply chain’s profit, consumer surplus, environmental impact and social welfare are the same, but only the thresholds are different. From the perspectives of supply chain member, supply chain system, consumer, environment and society, the new and remanufactured products with extended warranty service strategy is the best choice.
This paper investigates impacts of market segmentation and showrooming effect on the decision-making of an O2O supply chain, and puts forwards a contract to coordinate the O2O supply chain. Results show that, the showrooming effect is beneficial to the manufacturer, retailer and the supply chain, and the retailer will offer offline showrooming service. Under the influence of market segmentation, O2O supply chain is not necessarily better than single-channel supply chain structure. But adopting advertising and other means to improve consumers’ online channel acceptance, it can realize transformation from single-channel to O2O structure. The benefits of showrooming effect can eliminate the disadvantage of market segmentation. Moreover, a service cost sharing contract is put forward, which can perfectly coordinate the O2O supply chain with market segmentation and showrooming effect. These findings help managers to understand which channel structure is optimal by considering market segmentation and showrooming effect and identify possible pathways for them to perfectly cooperation.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.