This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits vertical and horizontal fairness concerns. The manufacturer or the retailer direct selling and e-commerce platform agency selling modes are employed to characterize the impact of retailer’s fairness concerns on the online channel mode strategy. Results show that the retailer’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale price and online channel mode strategy. Without the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer direct selling mode is the best strategy for the manufacturer, which harms the retailer’s utility. With the retailer’s fairness concerns, the manufacturer may choose the manufacturer direct selling or e-commerce platform agency selling mode. When the fairness concern parameters meet a certain range, the e-commerce platform agency selling mode strategy is better for the supply chain members, which can solve the interest conflict between supply chain members. These research findings help dual-channel supply chain members understand how to choose the channel structure strategy to balance the supply chain members’ interests by considering fairness concerns.

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.

This paper investigates the optimal showroom service strategy and power structure for online and offline retailers considering online consumer return. Combining two service strategies and three competition power structures, six models are constructed to analyze the effects of the showrooming effect and consumer return on retailers’ decisions and consumer surplus. The results show that the SS strategy is the best choice for offline retailers, and it is also an effective way to solve consumer return. Online retailers are suggested to cooperate with offline retailers to implement SS strategy and enhance the showrooming effect. Under the SS strategy, the offline-led power structure is the best choice for online retailers, but the online-led power structure is optimal for offline retailers. We also find that the supply chain and consumers are more likely to implement SS strategy and offline-led power structure. More importantly, we pinpoint that there is no incentive for retailers to implement the Nash power structure. Therefore, it is recommended to revitalize the real economy of offline retailers and implement the strategy SS effectively.

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In supply chain systems, when retailers have fairness concerns behavior, how to choose distribution strategy and online channel mode is significant to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain systems. A game theory is used to model the competitive relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer or an E-commerce platform in a dual-channel supply chain. The manufacturer can sell high-quality or low-quality products through online or offline channel. The manufacturer can directly sell products to consumers by himself or the E-commerce platform through the online channel. The manufacturer also can wholesale products to retailers and then retailers sell products to consumers through the online channel. Combining the two distribution strategies and three online channel modes, six dynamic models are constructed to analyze the effect of retailer's vertical and horizontal fairness concerns on the decisions of supply chain members. The results show that: the manufacturer direct selling mode and distribution strategy of selling high-quality or low-quality products through offline or online channel is better for the manufacturer and supply chain system under most conditions, which will damage the retailer's benefit. The retailer's fairness concerns do not affect the pricing strategy and consumer demands, and they do not necessarily bring more benefits to the retailer. When the E-commerce platform sets an appropriate commission fee, the agency selling mode is the best choice for supply chain members.</p>